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Introductory note
1. This is the fourth of a series of reports on the topic
of jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, prepared and submitted by the Special Rapporteur
for consideration and deliberation by the International
Law Commission. The series was preceded by an
earlier study presented by the Working Group on the
topic in July 1978 in the form of an exploratory report. l
2. It may be helpful to recall briefly that the first of
the series of reports on the subject was a preliminary
report 2 giving a historical sketch of international
efforts towards codification examining the sources of
international law and possible contents of the law of
State immunities, including the practice of States,
international conventions, international adjudication,
and opinions of writers as source materials, and an
inquiry into initial questions, definitions, a viable inductive approach, the general rule of State immunity
and possible exceptions to the general rule or limitations of State immunities, immunities from attachment
and-execution as well as other procedural questions and
related matters.
3. The second report of the Special Rapporteur,
submitted to the Commission at its thirty-second session, in 1980,3 and the third report, to its thirty-third
session, in 1981,4 have each in tum been discussed by
members of the Commission and have also received
extensive consideration and been the object of deliberation the Sixth Committee during the thirty-fifth
I A/CN.4/L.279/Rev.l, reproduced in part in Yearbook . .. 1978,
vol. II (Part Two), pp. 153-155.
2 Yearbook ... 1979, vol. II (Part One), p. 227, document
A/CN.4/323.
3 Yearbook ... 1980, vol. II (Part One), p. 199, document
A/CN.4/331 and Add.l; for the discussion in the Commission, see
Yearbook . .. 1980, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 138-141, paras. 111-122.
4 Yearbook ... 1981, vol. II (Part One), p. 125, document
A/CN.4/340 and Add.l; for the discussion in the Commission, see
Yearbook . .. 1981, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 154 et seq., paras.
208-227.

and thirty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly. 5
They have each been preJ?ared with the guidance of the
Commission6 on the baSIS of comments and observations of its members, as well as the views expressed by
representatives of Governments within the Sixth
COmmittee. 7
4. The second and third reports contain altogether
eleven draft articles, of which articles 1-5 form part I,
entitled "Introduction", and articles 6-11-now reconstituted in five articles numbered 6-10-form part II,
entitled "General principles". Of these eleven draft
articles, the Commission has adopted provisionally,
with the commentaries thereto,8 artIcle 1 (Scope of the
present articles) and article 6 (State immunity), as
follows:
PARr I
INTRODUCTION
Ankle 1.

SeoiH of 1M prtSeltl articles

The present articles apply to questions relating to the immunity of
one State aud its property from the jurisdiction of another State.

S See "Topical summary, prepared by the Secretariat, o.f ~he
discussion in the Sixth Committee on the report of the Commission
during the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly"
(A/CN.4/L.326), paras. 311-326; and "Topical summary, prepared
by the Secretariat, of the discussion in the Sixth Committee on the
report of the Commission during the thirty-sixth session of the
General Assembly" (A/CN.4/L.339), paras. 156-179.
6See Yearbook . .. 1979, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 1~186, paras.
166-183; Yearbook . .. 1980, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 139-141, paras.
114-122.
7 See footnote 5 above.
8 Yearbook . .. 1980, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 141 et seq., chap. VI,
sect. B.
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PART II

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Arliek 6. SItIU iIIuruuIity
I. A State is Immune from the JuriIdic:tioD f1I uotber State ill
eccordaDc:e with the provisions f1I the preseot m1icIa.
2. Beet IbaII be &ivea to State Immllllity ill acconIaDce with the
prorilioas f1I the preseot m1icIa.

5. Other draft articles in part I (Introduction) are
article 2 (Use of terms),9 article 3 (Interpretative
provisions),IO article 4 (Jurisdictional immunities not
within the sco~ of the present articles)lI and article 5
(Non-retroactivity of the present articles).12
9

"Article 2. Use of terms

"I. For the purposes of the present articles:
"(a) 'immunity' means the privilege of exemption from, or
suspension of, or non-amenability to, the exercise of jurisdiction by
the competent authorities of a territorial State;
"(b) 'jurisdictional immunities' means immunities from the
jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative authorities of a
territorial State;
"(c) 'territorial State' means a State from whose territorial
juriSdiction immunities are claimed by a foreign State in respect of
Itself or its property;
"(d) 'foreign State' means a State a~ainst which legal proceedings have been initiated within the Jurisdiction and under the
internal law of a territorial State;
"(e) 'State property' means propertr, rights and interests which
are owned by a State according to its mternallaw;
"~ 'tradmg or commercial activity' means:
"i a regular course of commercial conduct, or
"(li a particular commercial transaction or act;
"CR 'jurisdiction' means the competence or power of a territori81 State to entertain legal proceedings, to settle disputes, or to
adjudicate litigations, as well as the power to administer justice in
all its aspects.
"2. The provisions of I?aragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in
the present articles are Without prejudice to the use of those terms
or to the meaning which may be ascribed to them in the internal
law of any State or by the ruJes of any international organization."
10
"Article 3. 11IIerpretllJive provisions
1. "In the context of the present articles, unless otherwise
provided,
"(a) the el9'ression 'foreign State', as defined in article 2,
paragraph l(d) above, includes:
"(i) the sovereign or head of State,
"(ii) the central government and its various organs or departments,
"(iii) political subdivisions of a foreign State in the exercise of its
sovereign authority, and
"(iv) agencies or instrumentalities acting as organs of a foreign
State in the exercise of its sovereign authority, whether or
not endowed with a separate legal personality and whether
or not forming part of the operational machinery of the
central government.
"(b) the expreSSion 'jurisdiction', as defined in article 2, paragraph 1(g) above, includes:
"(i~ the power to adjudicate,
"(ii the power to determine questions of law and of fact,
"(iii the power to administer justice and to take appropriate
measures at all sta~es of legal proceedings, and
"(iv) such other admirustrative and executive ~wers as are
normally exercised by the judicial, or administrative and
police authorities of the territorial State.
"2. In determining the commercial character of a trading or
commercial activity as defined in article 2, paragraph 1(!) above,
reference shall be made to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than to its purpose."
"Article 4. Jurisdictional immunities not within
the scope of the present articles
"The fact that the present articles do not apply to jurisdictional
immunities accorded or extended to
"(i) diplomatic missions under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,
"(ii) consular missions under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1963,
"(iii) special missions under the Convention on Special Missions of
11

1969,

6. In addition to the commentaries thereto included
in the report of the Commission,13 draft articles 1 and 6
have drawn some further comments. The compromise
formulas such as the expression "Questions relating to"
in draft article 1 and the phrase "in accordance with the
provisions of the present articles" in draft article 6,
paragraphs 1-2, are open to review at a subsequent
sta~e, as the draft articles have been adopted proviSionally to allow the work of the Special Rapporteur
to proceed. At the suggestion of the Special Rapporteur, the Commission agreed to defer consideration of
draft articles 2-5 until it was in a position to examine
the remainder of the draft articles to be proposed on
the topic. It was noted that draft articles 4-5 were
submitted to serve as temporary signposts for the
framework of the projected plan of the draft articles. 14
It has also become apparent from subsequent debate
and decisions of the Commission that some of the
provisions of draft article 2 (Use of terms), especiall,Y
the expressions "territorial State" and "foreign State' ,
have been abandoned, while the need for further
clarification in draft article 3 (Interpretative provisions)
may depend on the desirability of putting some of its
provisions elsewhere, such as in the revised draft article
7, paragraph 3. 15
7. Draft article 6 (State immunity), provisionally
adopted by the Commission with commentary as the
first article in part II (General principles), has continued to draw further comments 10 the Sixth Committee durin~ subsequent sessions of the General
Assembly, 6 especially as the main general principle
preceding further draft articles in part II. Many suggestions have been made regarding alternative formulation
of the draft article, and these should be considered by
the Drafting Committee and the Commission itself in
the course of its thirty-fourth session.
8. The new wording of draft article 7 (Obligation to
give effect to State immunity),17 article 8 (Consent of
"(iv) the representation of States under the Vienna Convention on
the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character of 1975,
"(v) permanent missions or delegations of States to international
organizations in general.
"shall not affect:
"(a) the legal status and the extent of jurisdictional immunities
recognized and accorded to such missions and representation of
States under the above-mentioned conventions;
"(b) the application to such missions or representation of States or
international organizations of any of the rules set forth in the present
articles to which they would also be subject under international law
inde~ndently of the articles;
"(c) the application of any of the ruJes set forth in the present
articles to States and international organizations, non-parties to the
articles, in so far as such ruJes may have the legal force of customary
international law independently of the articles."
12
"Article 5. Non-retroactivity of the present articles
"Without prejudice to the application of any ruJes set forth in the
present articles to which the relations between States would be
subject under international law independently of the articles, the
present articles apply only to the granting or refusal of jurisdictional
unmunities to foreign States and their property after the entry into
force of the said articles as regards States r,arties thereto or States
having declared themselves bound thereby. '
13 See footnote 8 above.
14 Yearbook .. . 1980, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 139--140, para. 117.
15 Yearbook ... 1981, vol. II (Part Two), p. 157, para. 225.
16 See footnote 5 above.
17
"Article 7. Obligation to give effect to State immunity
"Paragraph I=Alternative A
"I. A State shall give effect to State immunity under [as stipu(COIIlinwd

~

. . . . . . . .~

~.:=p.=
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nut ptlg•. )

State),1S article 9 (E~ression of consent),19 and article
10 (Counter-claims) is awaiting consideration by the
Drafting Committee and the Commission. The revised
versions of draft articles 7-10 were recast by the Special
Rapporteur in the light of the rich and helpful debate at
the various meetings of the Commission on the topic2 1
and at the request of the Chairman of the Drafting
Committee, with a view to assisting the Drafting Committee in the expedition of its consideration.
9. It should be noted at this juncture that draft articles
7-11, in their original versions as well as in their revised
forms, have been the subject of extensive discussion
and comments in the Sixth Committee,22 even in the
still unfinished or half-finished stage of the drafting
exercise. The comments and observations within the
Sixth Committee, even at this early stage of the draft
articles, are so pertinent and serviceable for the current
task awaiting the Drafting Committee and the Commission that it would appear useful to include a brief
reference to them in this fourth report, which may
provide a useful bridge between part II (General
principles) and part III (Exceptions to State immunIty) of the draft articles.
(Foo/llott 17 conlilUU!d.)

lated in] article 6 by refraining from subjectin~ another State to the
jurisdiction of its otherwise competent judiCIal and administrative
authorities, (or] and by disallowing the (conduct] continuance of legal
proceedings against another State.

"Paragraph I-Alternative B
"I. A State shall give effect to State immunity under article 6 by
refraining from subjecting another State to its jurisdiction (and] or
from allowing legal proceedinss to be conducted against another
State, notwithstanding the eXISting competence of the authority
before which die proceedings are pending.
"2. For the pu!")X)5e Of parap-aph 1, a legal proceeding is
considered (deemed] to be one agamst another State, whether or not
named as a party, so long as the proceeding in effect seeks to compel
that other State either to submit to local jurisdiction or else to bear
the consequences of judicial determination by the competent authority which may (involve] affect the sovereign rights, interests, properties or activities of the State.
"3. In particular, a proceeding may be considered to be one
against another State (when] if it is instituted against one of its
organs, agencies or instrumentalities acting as a sovereign authority;
or against one of its representatives in respect of acts performed by
them as State representatives, or (if) it is designed to deprive another
State of its public property or the use of such property in its
possession or control."
NOTE: Paragraph 3 would constitute an alternative to the text of
aratt article 3, subparagraph 1(a).
18
"Article 8. Consent of State
"I. (Subject to part III of the draft articles] Un!ess. o~he.rwise
provided in the present articles, a State shall not exerCIse Jun~lctlon
10 any legal proceeding against another State (as defined 10 artIcle 7)
without the consent of that other State.

"2. Jurisdiction may be exercised in a legal proceeding against a
State which consents to its exercise."
19

"Article 9. Expression of consent

"I. A State may give its consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by
the court of another State under article 8, paragraph 2, either
expressly or by necessary implication from its own conduct in relation
to the proceeding in progress.
"2. Such consent may be Biven in advance by an ~xpress provision in a treaty or an internatIOnal agreement or a wntten contract,
expressly undertaking to submit to the jurisdictio~ C?r to waive State
immunity in respect of one or more types of actiVlttes.
"3. Such consent may also be Biven after a dispute has arisen by
actua1 submission to the jurisdicbon of the court or by an express
waiver of immunity, (in writing, or otherwise] for a specific case
before the court.
"4. A State is deemed to have given consent to the exercise of
jurisdiction by the court of another State by voluntary submission if it
bas instituted a legal proceeding or taken part or a step in the
proceeding relating to the merit, without raising a plea of immunity.
"5. A State is not deemed to have given such consent by
voluntary submission or waiver if it appears before the court of
another State in order specifically to assert immunity or its rights to
property and the circumstances are such that the State would have
been entitled to immunity, had the proceeding been brought against
it.
"6. Failure on tbe part of a State to enter ap~arance in a
proceeding before the court of another State does not Imply consent
to the exercise of jurisdiction by that court. Nor is waiver of State
immunity to be implied from such non-appearance or any conduct
other than an express indication of consent as provided in paragraphs
2 and 3.
"7. A State may claim or waive immunity at any time before or
during any stage of the proceedings. However, a State cannot claiJ?!
immunity from the jurisdiction of the court of another State after It
bas taken steps in the proceedings relating to the merit, unless it can
satisfy the court that It could not have acquired knowledge of the
facts on which a claim of immunity can be based, in which event it can
claim immunity based on those facts if it does so at the earliest
possible moment."
20
"Article 10. Counter-claims
"I. In any legal proceedings instituted by a State, or in which a
State has taken part or a step relating to the merit, in a court of
another State, }~sdiction may be exercise~ in .respect of any
counter-c1aim anslDg out of the same legal relatIonship or facts as the
principal claim, or if, in accordance with the provisions of the pre~nt
articles, jurisdiction could be exercised, had separate proceedings
been instituted before that court.
"2. A State malting a counter-claim in proceedings before a court
of another State is deemed to have given consent to the exercise .of
jurisdiction by that court with respect not only to the counter-clalm
but also to the principal claim, arising out of the same legal
relationship of facts (as the counter-claim J. "
21 Yearbook . .. 1981, vol. I, pp. 55 et seq., 16S3rd t~ 1657th
meetings, and pp. 110 et seq., 1663rd to 1665th meetlDgs; see
especially the summing-up by the Special Rapporteur, l?P. 76-79,
1657th meeting, paras. 2-24, and pp. 120-121, 1665th meettng, paras.
1-3 and 5.
22 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth
Session, Sixth Comminee, 45th to 52nd meetings; and "Topical
summary ... thirty-sixth session" (A/CN.4/L.339), paras. 156-179.

Draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property (continued)
PART III. EXCEPTIONS TO STATE IMMUNITY
ARTICLE 11 (Scope of the present part)

A. General considerations or the scope
or the present part
1.

LINKAGE BElWEEN GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND
EXCEPTIONS TO SlATE IMMUNITY

10. To eroceed from part n (General principles) to
part III (Exceptions to State immunity) without hav-

ing the final texts of all the draft articles in part II in
hand is inevitably to presume and presuppose a number
of propositions. While the draft articles in part II which
were the subject of preliminary as well as substantive
discussion by the Commission in the course of the
thirty-third session may be pending consideration and
final adoption by the Drafting Committee and provisional approval by the Commission, it is useful to
recall some of the instructions and guidance given by
the Commission and approved by the General Assem-

203

bly for past, current and future work on the topic to be
completed and presented by the Special Rapporteur.
(a) Source materials
There can be no mistake as to the source materials to
be consulted, which include not only national legislations, conventions, judicial decisions, State practice
and opinions of writers, but also an important volume
of information supplied by member Governments and
their replies to the questionnaire. 23 These are the
accepted sources of materials to be used and relied
upon.24
(b) Concentration on general principles
The Special Rapporteur has been directed to concentrate first and foremost on the general principles25
which he has endeavoured to incorporate in part II of
the study on the topic, and are now included in the
second and third reports. The areas of initial interest
relating to the substantive contents and constitutive
elements of the general rules of jurisdictional immunities of States are therefore treated in part II.
(c) Extent of the application
of State immunities
It was also understood that the question of the extent
of, or limitations on, the application of the rules of
State immunity, which is the subject of current examination in part III, required an extremely careful and
balanced approach, and that the exceptions identified
in the prehminary report26 were merely noted as possible exceptions, without any assessment or evaluation of
their significance in State practice. As a timely reminder, these possible exceptions to the general rule of
State immunity include:
1. Trading or commercial activity;
2. Contracts of employment;
3. Personal injuries and damage to yroperty;
4. Ownership, possession and use 0 property;
5. Patents, trade marks and other mtellectual
property;
6. Fiscal liabilities and customs duties;
7. Shareholdings and membership of bodies
corporate;
8. Ships employed in commercial service;
9. Arbitration.
(d) The inductive method
An inductive approach to the topic initially proposed
and adofted by the Commission has received general
approva by the General Assembly. Accordingly, the
method and techniques employed in the preparation
and presentation of reports and draft articles have been
inductive in the sense that conclusions and propositions
of law are to be drawn from the practice of States and
23 The replies of Governments to the questionnaire which the
Secretariat addressed to them on 2 October 1979. originally distributed as document A/CN.4/343 and Add. 1-4. are reproduced in
volume 20 of the United NationS Legislative Series. entitled Materials
on Jurisdictio1Ull Imnumiliu of Sillies and their Property (Sales No.
E/F.81.V.I0). pp. 557 et seq.
:USee the preliminary report. paras. 22-45 (Yearbook . .. 1979.
vol. (Part One). pp. 231 et seq .• document A/CN.4/323).
ZSSee Yurbook ... 1979. vol. n (Part Two). p. 186. para. 178.
-YeGI'book . .. 1979. vol. n (Part One). pp. 241-243. document
A/CN.4/323, paras. 68-81.

n

not in isolation from the living realities of customary
international law. The task before the Commission
includes a process of codification of existing practice
and progressive development of rules of international
law designed to reconcile, if not to resolve, the various
conflicts of interests :n the exercise of sovereign rights
and powers by States. The Special Rapporteur has
therefore endeavoured to proceed with the greatest
caution, following the direction and guidance furnished
by the Commission and the General Assembly. Deviation from the guidelines indicated would promote even
greater theoretical controversies and divergencies of
opinions which are more academic than practical.
2.

OBSERVATIONS MADE IN TIlE SIXTII CoMMITTEE
OF TIlE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

11. Without submitting an article-by-article analysis
of the comments and observations made by representatives of Governments in the General Assembly at its
thirty-sixth session,27 it miJtht be useful to make succinct references to some o(the salient points covered.
12. Most of the representatives who spoke on the
topic considered it one of the most important subjects
in the current programme of work of the Commission.
They appreciated the useful synthesis of the abundant
material concerning State practice found in the preliminary and second reports to the Commission. While
a number of representatives noted with satisfaction the
progress so far made by the Commission towards
elaborating a set of draft articles on the topic on the
basis of the reports submitted, some difficulties were
expressed in an effort to assess the Commission's work
at this stage. Some reservation of judgment has been
sounded while awaiting submission of the draft articles
contained in part III, which are intended to deal with
exceptions or limitations upon the general principles of
State immunity. This was not unnatural, owing to the
unfinished nature of the draft articles in part II, still to
be finalized by the Commission after consideration by
the Drafting Committee.
13. Several views were expressed with respect to the
nature and the scope of the topic, in an effort to identify
problem areas facing the Commission which it must
endeavour to avoid, circumvent or obviate in order to
achieve progress in dealing with the subject. The main
issues to be resolved in the treatment of part II
(General principles) are many and varied.
(a) The principle of State immunity
as a general rule
14. The question has been put time and again whether
State immunity is a rule, a general rule, a general
principle of international law , or rather an exception to
a more fundamental norm of State sovereignty of which
one aspect covers the exercise of various sovereign
powers, territorial, national and jurisdictional. Differences of opinion continue to exist in this particular
area. Reconciliation is possible, depending on how far
back one wishes to trace the origin of State immunity.
When dealing with principles of soverei~t¥-terri
torial, national or personal-immunity from Junsdiction
can be viewed without hesitation as an exception to the
general rule of State jurisdiction. But if one starts from
the topic of State immunity, taking into account the
27See "Topical summary ... thirty-sixth session" (A/CN.4/
L.339). paras. 1~179.

Jeneral practice of States as evidence of customary
mtemational law, jurisdictional immunity of States
could be viewed either as a rule, a general rule or a
Jeneral principle which itself admits of some exceptions
m State practice. Since the topic is entitled "Jurisdictional ~mu~ties of States and their propeI"!Y", the
proposItion IS warranted that State Immumty is a
general rule, rather than an exception to a more
fundamental norm of sovereignty, which it also inevitably is. It depends on the point of view from which the
question under examination is being treated. Dispute
as to the nature of State immunity as a general rule or
an exception to the general rule could be resolved by
reference to its context. Treating the topic of State
immunity as such, it cannot appear otherwise than as a
rule and not an exception to the rule. Indeed, even in
dealing with aspects of State sovereignty, from the
standpoint of the State claiming jurisdictional immunity
it is asserting its own sovereignty and not an exception
or waiver of its sovereign power. Viewed in that
context, the application or non-application of State
immunity represents the resolution of a conflict of
sovereignties between States, an effort to harmonize
conflicts of interests in the assurance of respect for
national sovereignty. The maxim par in parem imperium non habet is a valid starting point and a
convincing legal basis for the doctrine of State immunity.
(b) The scope of the topic
15. The question of scope has given rise to undue
concern over the widening concept of immunities from
jurisdiction, a situation which did not appear to be
extraordinary since the definitional problems had not
yet been fully discussed. Reference to draft article 2
(Use of terms) could afiord some helpful guidance. The
scope of the topic in this particular respect does not
extend beyond the judicial Jurisdiction, or adjudicatory
jurisdiction, which could include the exercise of some
administrative power in connection with pre-trial procedures and post-judgment execution orders. The
apprehension that the draft articles in part II (General
pnnciples) could be regarded as recognition of wider
Immunities than hitherto admissible in State practice
would appear to be without any valid ground or
justification. No one is discussing the possibility,
however remote, of immunity of one State from the
overall sovereign power of another State. Even the
maxim par in parem imperium non habet has never
been interpreted with such liberality as to give a State
unregulated freedom to exercise its sovereignty whereever it pleases and regardless of international law. Out
of the context of adjudication, jurisdictional immunities would not appear to be very meaningful. A State
does not normally exercise its sovereign power over
another State without being responsible for its acts of
domination. Nor can it exercise imperium within the
territory of another State without the latter's consent.
Such sovereign power, as adjudication of litigation, is
being exercised by the court within and over its own
territory, or territorial jurisdiction, or over everything
found on its own territory or within its territorial limits,
rather than being an exercise of sovereignty over or
against another State, unless it is present there by
mutual consent. In such event, the exercise of territorial judicial jurisdiction could be regulated by mutual
agreement. This does not preclude the possibility of a

State performing activities not in the exercise of imperium, but on the same footing as any other pc:rson,
national or foreign, natural or juridical, which are
Jenerally amenable or subject to the local or territorial
JurisdiCtIon. The fact that the activities are attributable
to a foreign sovereign State does not necessarily imply
the application of State immunity, especially where
such activities bear no relation to the exercise of any
sovereign power by that State.
(c) The relevance of lack of consent
as a matter of principle
16. Doubts were expressed regarding the relevance of
consent as a matter of principle. Fear was voiced lest
State immunity could be regarded as more absolute and
unqualified than it has hitlierto been admitted even in
the most generous State practice. A more thorough
examination of the draft articles in rart II will reveal
the true identity of the relevance 0 lack of consent,
which was presented not so much in the positive aspect
of consent as in that of a requirement of jurisdiction,
nor was consent as such put forward as the only
admissible exception to State immunity, nor indeed was
consent to be viewed as a sound basiS upon which to
found and exercise jurisdiction, territorial, national or
otherwise. The draft articles, in particular articles 8-10,
tend to support general prinCiples which are stated
diametrically differently from the proposition which
could prompt such apprehension. While consent of
State is not necessarily the foundation of jurisdiction,
let alone an exception to the exercise of existing
territorial jurisdiction, its absence has been put forward
as an essential element of State immumty. This is
practically the converse of the assertion that consent of
the defendant State permits the exercise ofJ·urisdiction,
although it would as a consequence exclu e or negate
the application of State immunity. The reverse was
actually suggested. Lack of consent is an ingredient or
constitutive element of State immunity. It follows from
this proposition that, conversely, the existence or expression or I?roof of consent precludes the claim of
State immuDlty without itself constituting a basis for
jurisdiction.
17. There could be varying degrees of consent, as
there are several ways of expressing it: by words or by
conduct, in advance or in facie curiae, generally or ad
hoc. Consent is a neutral term, colourless but sufficiently positive to exclude immunity in case of its
presence, although not necessarily adequate to found
Jurisdiction in every case. A more colouIfuI and active
expression of consent could take the form of actual
imtiation of a legal proceeding by a State. Bringing a
counter-claim is a less aggressive form of expressing consent. Without taking the initiative of itself instituting a
proceeding first, a State could nevertheless initiate a
counter-claim in answer to the principal claim instituted against it. Such positive action by the State is
tantamount to its submission to the jurisdiction of the
forum of another State, although the extent of its
volition is obviously far less than voluntary submission
by the State instituting the initial proceedmgs.
18. While lip-service abounds in the writings of £ublicists and in judicial decisions with respect to sigmficant
consensual theories or the various theories of consent,
such aspects have not been considered in fart II since
they belong more appropriately to part II . However,

the inductive approach has pre-empted premature
treatment of any doctrine before an analytical examination of State practice has been made. As will be seen,
the theories of consent, express and implied, have been
advanced in explanation of, or as Justification for,
several instances of rejection or denial of State immunity, and as additional doctrinal or theoretical basis for
an exception to State immunity in certain areas of State
activities.
19. Consent of the State as such has never been
regarded as a prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction by the court of another State, let alone a foundation of its jurisdiction. Rather it is its absence, or lack
of consent, which is a prerequisite of State immunity.
The .eresence, admission or expression in any form or
mamfestation of consent which is recognizable will
operate to eliminate, exclude or remove the possibility
of jurisdictional immunity. For this reason the question
of the establishment of consent of State, whicti can be
expressed by different methods and in different forms,
such as voluntary submission, waiver, agreement and
counter-claims, clearly forms part of the general principles of State immunities, and these methods are not
truly exceptions to the general rule of State immunity,
although by analogy they may have been so considered
in the judicial practice of some States or in some
national legislations or even international conventions
or agreements, for consent could lead to the same
result as exceptions, that is to say, the exercise of
jurisdiction or denial of immunity. Nevertheless, in the
ultimate analysis, in the present study lack of consent
and not consent of State as such is treated as part and
parcel of the general principles of State immunities.
The question of consent of State in connection with the
creation, constitution or scope of jurisdiction has not
been studied in part II in the second and third reports,
notwithstanding the expression of some reservation or
even hesitating reactions to some aspects of consensual
doctrine which could lend itself to strengthening "absolutism", long forsaken and exploded in the annals of
international practice of States.

establishment of competence or jurisdiction before proceeding to determine the applicability of the rule of
State immunity. There is no established order of priority among the various grounds on which the litigant
could challenge the exercise of jurisdiction by the
court.
21. Without in any way attemptin, to establish or
even suggest any order of prionty, It is nevertheless
submitted that the rules of competence of the court are
very relevant in all cases, whether or not the question
of State immunity is also involved. A fortiori, where
there is a claim of State immunity, jurisdiction is hiJdtly
relevant. Owing to the pre-eminent importance ofthe
rule of State immunity, involving considerations not
only of internal laws and national jurisprudence, but
often also principles of international law and comity of
nations or even diplomacy, the court is not particularly
reluctant to exanune a plea of State immunity in any
given case, even if it were to reach the ultimate
conclusion of jurisdiction negatively or positively. The
court could uphold its jurisdiction in such a case by
denying immunity. On the other hand, it could also
decline jurisdiction on the ground of State immunity or
on other grounds of lack of competence, or on the
doctrine of "act of State", which involves an examination of the merits of the case.28 Thus, a choice remains
open in draft article 7 as to whether or not to add, in
paragraph 1, alternative B, the phrase "notwithstandmg the existing competence of the authority before
which the proceedings are pending". The usefulness of
such a phrase is indeed relative, according to whether
or not it is included as a reminder of the relatively
logical necessity of competence or the existence of
jurisdiction so essentially relevant to jurisdictional immunity. Without the necessary jurisdiction, immunity
would seem to hang in the air and could be upheld or
confirmed only in principle or h¥,Po,thetically, as there
would in such a case be no jurisdiction from which the
foreign State would or would not be immune.

(d) The interrelations between competence

22. Because of the relativity of consent, or rather
expression thereof, which could at any time operate to
frustrate a claim of State immunity, the rule or principles of State immunity must maintain a liberal measure
of flexibility. It was noted that State immunity was
never claimed to be a rule of jus cogens, and this is not
unsupported in practice. There is no breach of international obligation for a State to over-extend the courtesy
of non-exercise of jurisdiction or to accord State immunity beyond the extent recognized or required by
international law . Indeed, several international instruments even provide for such latitude .or flexibility,
leaving the choice open to States in certain specified
areas of the activities involved to withhold qr uphold a
claim of immunity. In point of fact, in the course of
progressive evolution of State practice there has been
no strong protest or international complaint or litigation by a State adjudged a debtor after its claim of
immunity was denied, duly or otherwise.

and State immunity

20. Differences of view were also expressed regarding
the relativity or relevance of competence in the sense of
judicial or adjudicatory jurisdictIOn. In strict logic, the
question of jurisdictional immunity of States does not
and should not arise in cases where there is no jurisdiction in the circumstances to begin with. This proposition did not draw any objections from representatives
of civil-law systems, where the court may declare itself
incompetent in the face of a plea of jurisdictional
immunity, declining jurisdiction either on the ground
that the defendant is entitled to immunity or that the
court is otherwise incompetent, that is, lacking the
necessary jurisdiction or competence. The distinction
between incompetence d'attribution and immunite de
juridiction, for mstance, is not always drawn, and when
it is, is often too fine to admit of adequate expression or
precision, whereas logic tends to support the {)roposition that, in all cases where the courts have no Jurisdiction, there is no need to question the possibility or
legitimacy of a claim of State immunity. In actual
practice, however, the pragmatic approach of the common-law tradition coul(l not accord any priority to the
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(e) The relative flexibility

of State immunity

"'See, for instance, the case UbYIIn-AmeriaUI OU ConIpGny V.
SociIIIirt People's UbYIUI Arab Jtmllllairi.111 (1980). U.S. Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia CirCUIt (11tle17Ulliofllll Leglll

ltltilerials (Washington, D.C.), vol. XX. No.1 (January 1981). p.
161).
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23. It is also true that a State is buffered or cushioned
by two pbases of jurisdictional immunity, each being
independent of the other, namely immunity from pretrial jurisdiction, which extends to the trial up to final
decision, and immunity from post-judgment measures
of execution, in satisfaction of the judgment. A separate waiver is required in each case, so as to delay the
effect of possible enforcement measures aftecting a
foreign State or its property. Both of these could
conveniently be maintained so as to allow furtber
moments of reflection and a breathing space for negotiations to achieve a meaningful settlement of a dispute
involving a foreign State by pacific means that could be
extrajudicial, or even extralegal. Far from being a rule
of jus cogens, tbere is thus ample room for Bexibility in
the field of jurisdictional immunity of States.

(f) The dual approach
24. In an endeavour to verify the division or separation of areas of activities conducted by States which are
immune from the jurisdiction and others wbich are
amenable or subject to the jurisdiction of the competent authorities, a novel sU$8estion was made by a
re(,resentative. Without haVIng to predetermine the
eXIstence of a ~eneral rule of State immunities, it would
not be imposSible to proceed to examine State practice
which could provide definite evidence of the two types
of circumstances: cases where State immunity operates
and cases of non-immunity. In other words, a search
could be made at the same time to identify activities
which are QCtIl jure imperii, where State immunity
applies, and activities which are acta jure gestionis,
where State immunity is not applicable.
25. At first glance, this two-pronged or dual approach
appears promising and deserves consideratton in
greater depth. The suggestion seems worthy of experiment, if not ultimate pursuit. It is respectfully submitted,
bowever, without wishing to abandon any worthwhile
suggestion, that the dual approach need not necessarily
result in time-saving, although efforts would bave to be
redoubled. It could be likened to an endeavour "to
bum the candle at both ends", indeed without being
certain that it is the same candle ane;! that "both ends"
would eventually meet. Nor is it assured that there
would be no overlal?ping or gap, or twilight zone or
borderland wbere eXIsting uncertainties would not only
linger but would continue to be preserved and even to
grow.
26. The dual approach would not appear to be consistent either with State practice or international agreements and conventions, which tend to recognize a
general rule of State immunity, as adopted in draft
article 6, while admitting the possibility of qualifications as to yrinciples, and limitations as to exceptions to
the genera principles. Without ensuring greater speed
or expedition in the ('rogress of the CommiSSIon's
work, since the expressIon acta jure imperii is not free
from ambiguities, ambivalence and equivocation, sucb
a two-pronged undertaking would in fact increase the
burden of the task by more than doubling it. To
increase the workload without essentially saving time
would not appear to be a fruitful pursuit. Besides, the
existing structure, half-way completed, would bave to
be completely dismantled and structured anew to prepare for results that do not seem to be any more certain
or concrete than the path now mapped out and well

sign-posted, which is relatively assured to lead to
tangible and positive results, whatever they may be.

(g) The reumons between the rules
tmd the general exceptions
'1:7. The transition from part II (General principles)
to part III {Exceptions to State immunity} could be
made more harmonious by a provision establishing or
cl~ng the connecting link between the general
prinetples set out in part II and the general exceptions
contained in part In. This could further obviate the
difficulties mentioned by one representative with regard to the formulation of draft article 6, which was
stated in normative form on account of the phrase "in
accordance with the provisions of the present articles".
In his opinion, a rule of State immunity could be stated
in more definite form, as in article 15 of the European
Convention on State Immunity.291bis formulation bad
the advantage of clarity, in the sense that the Convention stated all possible exceptions before the statement
of &general rule. It should be observed, however, that
the reverse could achieve the same result, as appears to
be the case in article 1, "Immunity from jurisdiction",
of the United Kingdom State Immunity Act 197830 and
also in section 1604, "Immunity of a foreign State from
jurisdiction", of the United States Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976. 31 The link between the general
rule and the exceptions appears to have been missing
only because the exceptions have not yet been fully
stated, as consideration of part III is only starting. It
was thus understandable that some reluctance was
voiced before seeing or identifying and verifying the
&CteJ?tability of the possible exce('tions listed, which
requrre careful and delicate conSideration. The formulation of article 6 as adopted by the Commission, "in
accordance with the proviSIons of the present articles" ,
was intended to establish beyond dou!)t that the applicable law would be the law of the convention being
elaborated and not the customary law. Indeed, if the
draft articles envisaged are formulated to reBect accurately State practice on the subject, tben the p'hrase in
question would not have the effect of disqualifying tbe
29

"Article 15

"A Contracting State shall be entitled to immunity from the
jurisdiction of the courts of another Contracting State if the proceedmgs do not fan within Articles 1 to 14; the court shan decline to
entertain such proceedings even if the State does not appear."
Council of Europe, European Convention on SUllt Immunity tuid
Additional Protocol, European Treaty Series, No. 74 (Strasbourg,

1972).

:!OThe British Act of 1978 provides:

"PART I
"PltOCEEDlNGS IN UNITED KINGDOM BY
OR AGAINST OlHER STATES

"Immunity from jurisdiction
"1.

(1) A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United Kingdom except· as provided in the follOwing provisions
of this Part of this Act.
(United Kingdom, The Public GennaJ Acts, 1978, part 1, chap. 33, p.
715.)
31The United States Act of 1976 provides:

"SeClion 1604: Immunity of II foreign StIlte
from jUrUdiction
"Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at die time of enactment of this Act a foreign state
sball be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States and of the States except· as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of
this chapter. " (United Sillies Code, 1976 EdiIion, vol. 8, title 28, chap.
97, p. 207).

norm stated in draft article 6 from being a basic rule of
international law. All these preoccupations would disappear once the entire draft articles, including the
provisions of part III, are completed.
28. In the meantime, these lingering doubts and
hesitations could be eliminated by inserting a transitional provision to bridge the relationship between
the general principles stated in part II and the general
exceptions to be dISCUSSed in part III. In response to the
concerns expressed and for the sake of greater clarity,
an introductory provision might be in order to preface
the ensuing provisions of part III.
.

29.

B. Text or draft article 11
Draft article 11 reads as follows:
Article 11. Scope

.eel

0/ the present part

Except as provided in the foUowing articles of the
present part,
sbaII be given to the general principles or State immunity as contained in part II of the
present articles.
ARTICLE 12 (Tndiag or commercial dvity)

A. General considerations of the exceptions
1. LIMITATIVE NATURE OF THE EXCEmoNS
30. As has been recalled, the general rule of State
immunity is formulated in draft article 6 in relative
terms, since its application is qualified by the phrase "in
accordance with the provisions of the draft articles"
and is clearly limited by the exceptions contained in
part III. Other general principles as stated in part II are
equally subject in their application to the exceptions
listed m part III. Thus, the obligation to give effect to
State immunity in draft article 7, as a corollary to the
general rule of State immunity, is also subject to each
and every exception provided m part III. Similarly, lack
of consent as an element of State immunity as mentioned in draft article 8, as well as the various methods
of expressing consent illustrated in draft articles 9-10
whicti, if established, would operate to disqualify or
nUllify any claim of State immunity, would have no
application in regard to any of the circumstances which
constitute an exception to the general rule or principles
of State immunities. Thus, according to the present
formulation of rules and exceptions, the establishment
of consent, which is inconsistent with State immunity, is
not viewed as an exception to immunity; rather, in
cases where there is clearly no consent or there is an
apparent lack of consent which is a constitutive element
of State immunity (draft article 8), the rule of State
immunity still has no application if the circumstances
fall within one of the exceptions to be examined in part
III.
31. The exceptions appear to be limitative in nature;
that is to say, they serve to restrict or limit the
operation or application of a seneral rule of State
immunity, whether it is the active rule for the State
claiming immunity or its corollary, the obligation to
give eff¢ to immunity, or to lDlplement the first
general rule, or indeed the requirement of absence of
consent or unwillingness to submit to jurisdiction. In
the last instance, in spite of lack of consent and against
the will of the foreign sovereign State, the exceptions to
State immunities, when established, serve to clear the

path for the court to exercise its normal jurisdiction
even in regard to an unwilling foreign sovereign State.
In the circumstances falling within any of the accepted
exceptions, the rule of State immunity as an obstacle to
the exercise of jurisdiction is overcome or obviated or
removed, regardless of the state of mind of the defendant and irrespective of its unwillingness or absence of
consent to the institution or continuation of the proceedings.
2. LEGAL BASIS FOR LIMITING STATE IMMUNITY
32. It is only in a manner of speaking that State
immunity may be said to be restricted or limited, in the
sense that it is not "absolute" or accorded in every type
of circumstances, regardless of the capacity in which
the State has acted or irrespective of the category of
activities attributable to the State. The juridical basis
for "non-immunity" may be described as the counterpart of the legal basis for "State immunity". If the
exercise of imperium by a State was the basis for
immunity, then the absence of connection with imperium, or the non-exercise of sovereign power by the
State, would afford the raison d'etre for cases of
"non-immunity". If it can be said that a State is
immune on account of, or because of, or in respect of
its acts or activities in the exercise of its sovereign
power, or in the performance of its sovereign functions,
then likewise tliat immunity ceases where no such
sovereign act or activity or power or function of a State
is involved or affected by the exercise or resumption or
continuation of judicial authority by the court of
another State. The criteria which may serve to circumscribe or limit the field of operation or to narrow or
delineate the scope of application of the doctrine or
rule of State immunity are many. It is the purpose of
the present part of the articles to examine each of these
criteria which tend to restrict the application of immunity in State practice.
33. Whatever the legal basis or justification for State
immunity or for the corresponding obligation to recognize and to give effect to State immunity as earlier
discussed in part II, it seems clear that the scope and
extent of its application is limited thereby. Immunity
operates as long as there is a legal basis for it. In the
absence of such basis, there is no immunity. Thus, the
reverse of legal justification for "immunity" is the legal
basis for "non-immunity". For each and every type of
limitation on State immunity or for each exception to
the general rule of immunity, there a{>pears to be an
op~site case or a converse set of crrcumstances in
whlch State immunity is not recognized and immunity
need not be accorded. The justification for denial of
State immunity in each of the cases of exceptions to
State immunities is to be found accordin~ly in the
nature of the activities of the State in question or the
field of activities undertaken by or attributable to that
State, in relation to which or in connection with which a
dispute or cause of action has arisen.
34. These "opposites" or "converse cases" are often
not as clear-cut as would be desirable. Yet in State
practice they have been employed to distinguish between cases of "immunity" and those of "non-immunity". One way of justifying non-recognition of State
immunity in a given case is the absence or nonexistence of reasons or valid grounds for allowing State
immunity in such a case. State immunity has therefore

been denied on several grounds, including, inter alia,
the fact that the case concerned exclusively private-law
activities or private acts which bear no relation to the
public image or public and official functions of a State,
or acts which can be performed and activities which are
normally conducted by individuals or by States and
individuals alike in the same or indistinguishable capacity or manner. The legal basis for "non-immunity" IS to
be found therefore in one or several of the distinctions
which appear to have been worked out and countenanced in the judicial and governmental practice of
States.

3. THE VAlUOUS DISTINCTIONS
35. If the absence of State immunity can be based on
several grounds which relate to the nature and types of
activities attributable to a State, it is useful to examine
even briefly some of the distinctions drawn between
acts or activities to which State immunity is applicable
and those not covered by immunity.
(a) Dual personality of the State
36. A State is sometimes said to be endowed with a
double or dual personality. A State may assume the
role of an ente politico, 32 or political entity, just as it can
also do all other things like any other corporate entity
vested with legal or juridical personality, corpo morale,
"it being incumbent upon (the State1 to provide for the
administration of the pubhc body and for the material
interests of the individual citizens, it must acquire and
own t>roperty, it must contract, it must sue and be sued,
and 10 a word, it must exercise civil rights in like
manner as any other juristic person or private individual" ("un altro corpo morale 0 privato individuo
qualunque").33
(b) Dual capacity of the State
37. In a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals of
Florence, a distinction has been recognized in the
practice of States between the State as political (>Ower,
potere eolitico, and as persona civile, or Juristic
person. Denying immunity in an action for services
rendered, while recognizing the principle of immunity
based on the independence of States, the Corte di
Cassazione of Florence said:
. . . ; however, when these high prerogatives are not involved,
when the Government, as a civil body, descends into the sphere of
contracts and transactions so as to acquire rights and to assume
obligations like any private person, then its independence is not
pertinent. The State, when dealing solely with private transactions
and obligations, must follow the rules of the common law. 35
• 32 See, for
ID Morellet

instance, a decision by the Corte di Cassazione of Turin
v. Governo Danese (1882) (Giurisprudenza /taliana
(Turin). vol. XXXV, part 1 (1883). pp. 125 and 13(H31).
33Ibid., pp. 130-131, cited and trans. in the Harvard Law School
draf~ convention on competence of courts in regard to foreign States.
herelDafter called "the Harvard draft" (Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, part III, "Competence of Courts in
regard to Foreign States" (Cambridge, Mass .• 1932). published as
SupplefMnt to The American Journal of International Law (Washington. D.C.), vol. 26 (1932), pp. 481-482). See also Hamspohn v. Bey
di Tunisi (1887) (II Foro Italiano (Rome), vol. XII (1887), part 1, pp.
485-486), cited and trans. in the Harvard draft, op. cit., pp. 480-481.
"Gunieres v. Elmilik (1886) (II Foro Italiano (Rome), vol. XI.
part 1 (1886), pp. 913 and 919-921), a decision confirming that of the
Court of Appeal of Lucca (1886) (ibid., p. 490).
lSPassage cited in utenso by the Court of Appeal of Lucca in
HamspohiJ v. Bey di Tunisi (1887) (see footnote 33 above).

~.truth,once the distinction between the Government as a body
polittc [Govemo erau politico) and the Government as a civil entity
[Govemo eme civile) is admitted, once it is recognized that even a
State may by reason of acts of purely administrative nature, without
offence to its political sovereignty, be made subject to the jurisdiction
of foreign courts, there can be nothing more correct than that the
foreign State against whom in this capacity a proceeding is instituted,
must be included in the category of foreigners contemplated. . ., the
States being, in this respect, ass.imilated to other persons, physical or
juristic, Dot forming part of the Italian Kingdom.36

(c) Acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis
38. Allusion has earlier been made to the distinction
that has become a catchword in State practice between
acta jure imperii, on the one hand, for which States are
immune, and acta jure gestionis, jure privatorum, on the
other, for which no immunity is accorded. Thus, in a
case involving a contract concluded by the consul as a
State agent for the maintenance of a Greek subject
sheltered in the asylum of Aversa, the Corte di Cassazione of Naples held that:
... the State does become subject to courts insofar as it operates
within the sphere of civil transactions, and it has never been objected
that the sovereignty of the State has been injured thereby; whereas
the rationality of the law' would suffer from the opposite theory
whereby it [i.e. the State) would claim the power to pursue its rights
as plaintiff. while remaining beyond the reach of such action on the
part of others.J7

This distinction between atti d'impero and atti di gestione has also been recognized in the practice of other
States. 38 Expressions such as "acts de gestion privee" or
activities "jure et more privatorum" and "actes de
puissance publique" or "actes de pouvoir" have also
36Ibid., pp. 920 and 922; cited and trans. in the Harvard draft, op.
cit., pp. 622-623. Cf. the decision of the Tribunal civil of Brussels in
Societe pour 1a fabricalion de car/ouches v. Colonel Mutkuroff,
Ministre de 1a gue"e de 1a principautt de Bulgarie (1888) (Pandectes
periodiques, 1889 (Liege), p. 350. case No. 309), in which the court
assumed jurisdiction against Bulgaria in respect of a contract for the
purchase of bullets. It was held that, in making contracts with the
Belgian company, Bulgaria acted as a private person, and as such
submitted itself to all the civil consequences of the contracts.
3?Typaldos. Console di Grecia v. Manicomio di Aversa (1886)
(Giurisprudenza Italiana (Turin), vol. I (1886), p. 229); cited and
trans. in the Harvard draft, op cit., pp. 624-625 .
38 See , for example, for Belgium, Feldman v. Etat de Bahia (1907)
(Pasicrisie beige, 1908 (Brussels), part 2, p. 55), cited in the Harvard
draft, op. cit., p. 484; and Monnoyer et Bernard v. Etat franfais
(1927) (Pasicrisie beige, 1927 (Brussels). part 3, pp. 12~132); cited in
the Harvard draft, op. cit .• p. 615; in that case the Charleroi Tribunal
civil observed that:
". . . in operating these services [the Office of Reconstruction at
Valenciennes), the [French) State does not bring public authority
('Ia puissance pubhque') into play, but is doing something that
can be done by indiViduals, and therefore acts as a civil or private
person ... having dealt with its contracting partner as an equal

.

. ..

"In giving judgment in the present case, although it involves
the French State, the court in no way impairs the sovereignty of
that country; it is simply giving judgment, as it would with
respect to a French citizen. since in fact the action has been
brought against the State as a result of acts performed by it. not
jure imperiae, but jure gestionis, as so aptly expressed by Mr.
Gianzana. an Italian author quoted bX Rolin in his work Traitt
du droit international (vol. I. p. 219). '
Cf. the Egyptian cases cited by S. Sucharitkul in "Immunities of
foreign States before national authorities", Recueil des cours de
I'Academie de droit international de La Haye, 1976-1, vol. 149
(Leyden, Sijthoff, 1977), p. 138.
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been used. 39 Others such as "actes de gouvernement",
"actes d'autorite" and "actes de souverainete" are not
unfamiliar to those conversant with the French system
of administrative law. 40
39. In actual practice, the line of distinction to be
drawn between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis
does not appear to be readily visible in every case.
Borderline cases are not infrequent, particularly since
the traditional concept of State functions or governmental functions has fundamentally changed in consequence of the continuous extensions of functions
performed or assumed by States. 41 It is in this borderland that controversy flourishes.

(d) Public and private nature of State

acts or activities

40. Another type of distinction well known in the
practice of States relates to the nature or character of
the acts or activities performed by the States or their
agencies, or otherwise attributable to the governmental
authorities. Several similar terminologies have been
used, such as ",PUblic" and "private" activities, "publiclaw authority' and "private-law transactions". Activities can be "governmental" or "non-governmental".
Thus, in a jurisdiction, immunity was denied to a
foreign sovereign on the ground that "even the national
sovereign is subject to ordinary law for his obli~ations
of a proprietary nature" and that the proceedmg did
not relate to acts done by the reigning sovereign "as
head of his own State", for the engagements in question had their origin in "contracts and acts of a pnvate
nature".42 Similarly, in another case involving a contract concluded by an accredited ambassador as agent
of a foreign government for the purchase of property to
be used as embassy buildings, the court assumed jurisdiction in respect of an act performed by the ambassador during hiS term of office as State agent. Although
the contract touched an instrumentum legati, it was held
to be "a private-law transaction for the acquisition of
private rights". 43

39 See , for instance, a case concerning the S.S. "Sumatra": Capi·
taW Hall, commandant Ie "Sumatra" v. Capitaine Ben$oa, commandant Ie "Mercedes" (1920) (Journal du droit international (Clunet)
(Paris), vol. 48, p. 270), a vessel belonging to the British Crown but

operated by a private mdividual for commercial voyages, where the
Mixed Court of Appeal of Alexandria used the expressions "dans la
gestion de ses interetsjrivb" and "compietement en dehors de son
action polilique"; cite in the Harvard draft, op. cit.,y. 616. In the
case Zaki bey Gabra v. R.E. Moore Esq. et aurre (1927) (Gazene des
triblUUJUX mixtes d'Egypte (Alexandria), vol. 17, No. 198 (April
1927), p. 104), the court opposed an "acte de puissance publique" to a
"contrat du droit prive"; cited in the Harvard draft, op. cit., p. 616.
40The terms "acte d'aUlorite" and "acte de gouvemement" are
known to French jurists as being the criterion for the division of
competence between administrative and civil tribunals and for designating government acts which are not subject to review by any court.
See C. J. Hamson, "Immunity of foreign States: The practice of the
French courts", The British Year Book of Internatioilal Law, 1950
(London), vol. 27, p. 293.
.
41 See, for example, a Netherlands decision in F. Advokaat v. I.
Schuddinck & den Belgischen Staat (1923) (Weekblad van het Recht
(The Hague, 1923). No. 11088); Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, 1923-1924 (London), vol. 2 (l9~3), case No. 69,
pp. 13>-134), accepting the distinction between acts jure gestionis
and acts jure impeni, but which still held a public tug service to be a
governmental function.
42Carlo d'Austria v. Nobili (1921) (Giurisprudenza Ita/Ulna
(Turin), vol. I (1921), p. 472; summary and trans. in Annual Digest
. . . , 1919-1922, vol. I (1932), case No. 90, p. 136). .

41. This type of distinction as to the nature of the acts
attributable to the State is not necessarily dissimilar
from the distinction between acta jure imperii and acta
jure gestionis, and may be considered as a different
e~ression of the same kind of distinction with emphasis on the nature of the activities, public or private,
governmental or non-governmental, while the characteristics of jure imperii may relate more generally to the
sovereign authonty or the governmental character of
the State function or public capacity in which the State
has acted. Accordingly, the distinction between acta
jure imperii (public acts) and acta jure gestionis (private
acts) could be said to be more comprehensive, or a
collective division of State acts, whereas other variations found in State practice could be viewed as a
"nuance" or a shade of difference in emphasis. 44
42. Such distinctions have also been made regarding
the "public" and "non-public" purposes of an act or
property attributable to the State, publicis usibus destinata. In the actual application of such a distinction,
which relates more to the ultimate objective or purpose
and thereby depends on a SUbjective test rather than an
objective criterion, difficulties and confusion have
occurred. 45 The distinctions between the "governmental" and "non-governmental" nature of the acts or
services or purposes have been drawn, although they in
fact constitute but further variations of this same type
of division of State acts.46

(e) Commercial and non-commercial activities

43. Another type of distinction has been drawn between acts or activities of a State of a "commercial
nature" or "non-¥overnmental nature" and those of
"non-commercial' and/or "governmental" nature, or
for commercial and non-commercial purposes. This
distinction has opposed trading activities to non-trading
43 See, for example, Peruccheni v. Puig y Casaurano (1928) (Rivista
di dirino internazionale (Rome), XXth year, series III, vol. VII
928), p. 521; Annual Digest ... , 1927-1928 (London), vol. 4
1931), case No. 247, p. 365). Compare recent junsprudence in the
ederal Republic of Germany where, in the case X v. Empire of . ..
ranl (1963) (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungs·gericht
Tubmgen), vol. 16 (1964), p. 27; English trans. in United Nations,
ateriDIs on lurisdictionallmmunities . .. , (op. cit.), pp. 282 et seq.),
a repair contract for an embassy heating system was held by the
Federal Constitutional Court to lie outside the sphere of public
authority and was to be regarded as a "non-sovereign act". See also
the reply of the Federal Republic of Germany (ibid., pp. 571-572) to
question 6 of the questionnaire sent to Governments in 1979 (see
footnote 23 above). See also C. C. A. Voskuil, "Decisions of
Netherlands courts involving State immunity", Nether/ands Inter·
national Law Review (Leyden), vol. XX (1973), p. 302.
44See, for example, the reply of the United Kingdom to question 6
of the questionnaire addressed to Governments in 1979 (United
Nations, MaterUils on Jurisdictional Immunities . . " p. 624); the
United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978 distinguishes between acts
which are performed in the exercise of sovereitln authority and other
acts not so performed. Cf. the reply of the Uruted States of America
to the same question, indicating that immunity does not extend to
private acts (ibid., pp. (i~31).
45This distinction was used in the practice of some common-law
countries, especially the United Kingdom, and has proved less
workable since in the ultimate analysis State property and all
activities of States are "destined to I?ublic uses". Intentions, motives
and purposes are often not distinguIshable.
46The e~ression "used ... on Governmental and non-commer·
cial service' has been employed in some conventions, for example in
article 3, para. I, of the International Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of State-owned Vessels
(Brussels, 10 April 1926) with Additional Protocol (Brussels, 24 May
1934) (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. CLXXVI, p. 199) .
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activities of the State, and contrasted "commercial
transactions" to the acts in the exercise of the governmental or sovereign authority of the State. Thus, in
a case before the civil Court of Rome, a judgment was
given in favour of an Italian merchant for goods sold
and delivered to an aviation base in Gallipoli for the
French Government. 47 This distinction has been further
reinforced by a theory of implied consent to submit to
the exercise of jurisdiction by the sovereignty controlling the territory into which a foreign State has transplanted itself.48 A contract for the delivery of silk
cocoons by a commercial agency of a foreign Government was held to "retain the character of trading
operation" involving all its consequences, not excluding that of an implied renunciation. 49
44. This distinction between "commercial" and "noncommercial" acts or activities of a State is sometimes
associated with another more general type of distinction between "government or governmental and noncommercial" activities, on the one hand, and "commercial and non-governmental" activities on the other. The
use of this double criterion indicates a sense of uncertainty and urgency in the search for some such distinctions to serve as a basis for limiting or restricting State
immunities in a given set of circumstances. The opposition between "trading" and "non-trading" operations
tends to cater for a similar solution in support of a
restrictive trend which appears to have recently prevailed. Several expressions have also been used and
adopted in the case laws of many jurisdictions as well as
in national le~islations-"commercial transaction",
"trading operatIon", "trading activities", "acte de commerce" in the sense of "operation commerciale", or an
"acte" having a "but commercial et d'interet prive", or a
"recherche de benefices" inspired by an "idee de lucre et
de speculation" as distingUished from an "acte politique" having a "but d'interet international et politique". 50

45. This distinction, which differentiates between
commercial activities or trading operations conducted
by a State in respect of which there is no jurisdictional
immunity and other activities of a State of non-commercial or non-trading nature for which there could
be State immunity, serves to restrict or limit the scope
and extent of State immunity, rather than to extend it
to every imaginable type of non-commercial activity
which may still fall within the ambit of other categories
of exceptions to the general rule of jurisdictional
immunity. The various distinctions so far considered
could each, or in combination, serve as a basis for
denying or rejecting a claim of State immunity. Thus,
an act or operation or activities performed or conducted by or on behalf of a State could answer the
definition of "commercial transactions" or "trading
activities", for which no immunity need be accorded.
The grounds for "non-immunity" in cases of commercial transactions could e'l.ually be based on anyone or
two or more of the distmctions between the various
types of activities of State, such as the dual personality
of a State, as political entity and as a civil or corporate
entity; "Etat commerfant", or the dual capacity in
which a State may act as a sovereign authority or as a
private person. Immunity could be denied in respect of
commercial activities on the ground that such activities
form part of a series of acts jure gestionis, or "actes de
gestion privee" or "actes d'administration". Immunity
could indeed be withheld in respect of trading activities
on the basis of the private or private-law nature of the
activities involved. A narrower but perhaps a more
widely recognizable ground for disallowing a claim of
State immunity appears to be, first and foremost, that
of trading activities or commercial transactions.
B. Trading or commercial activity as an exception
to State immunity

1.
v. Govemo della Repubblica Francese (1924) (Rivista di
diritto internazionale (Rome), XVIIth year, series III, vol. IV (1925),
p. 236; and Annual Digest . .. 1923-1924 (London), vol. 2 (1933),
case No. 66, p. 129).
48Rivista . .. , p. 239.
¥JTesini case: Rappresentanza commerciale dell'Unione Repubbliche Soviet v. Ditta Tesini e Malvezzi ed altr; (1924) (11 Foro Italiano
(Rome), vol. L (1925), pp. 830, 835; and Annual Digest ...
1925-1926 (London), vol. 3 (1929), case No. 127, p. 176). See also
Rapprf!sentanza commerciale dell'URSS v. Societil di Navigazione
Generale "Gerolimich" (1936) (II Foro Italiano, vol. LXIII (1938), p.
1216; and Annual Digest . .. 1938-1940 (London), vol. 9 (1942), case
No. 84, p. 247).
50 See , for example, the case of the "Hungerford", where the
decision of the Tribunal de Commerce of Nantes, in Societe maritime
auxiliaire de transports v. Capitaine du vapeur anglais "Hungerford"
(1918) (Revue de droit international prive (Darras) (Paris), vol. XV
(1919), p. 510), was reversed by the Court of Appeal of Rennes in
Capitaine Seabrook v. Societe maritime auxiliaire de transports (1919)
(ibid., vol. XVIII (1922-1923), p. 743), which found that the
HunQerford was employed "dans un but d'interet politique, pour les
besoms de la defense nationale, en dehors de toute idee de lucre et de
speculation ... " (ibid., p. 744); summary in Annual Digest . ..
1919-1922 (op. cit.), case No. 83, pp. 122-124. Cf. Lakhowsky v.
Office suisse des transports exterieurs (1921) (ibid., pp. 745 et seq.),
where the Court of Appeal of Paris reversed the decision of the
Tribunal de commerce de la Seine that a contract for the supply of
goods to be imported into Switzerland was a commercial transaction
("acre de gestion") (ibid., p. 746). Such hesitations persist throughout
the historical development of French case-law; see an interesting
commentary by D. Yiannopoulos in regard to the case Corporacion
del Cobre v. Braden Copper Corporation et Societe Le groupement
d'importation des metaux (1972), in Revue generale de droit international public (Paris), vol. 77 (1913), p. 1240. See also, for summary of

IDENTIFIABILITY OF TRADING OR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY

47 Storelli
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46. The most common place or common ground for
an apparent excep.tion to the rule of State immunity is
likely to be claSSified as trading or commercial activities. An activity attributable to a State which could be
qualified as "trading" or "commercial" is readily
identifiable as acts, transactions, operation or course of
conduct which may, with sufficient clarity, be generally
visible, easily understood and as such, practically
meaningful in the light of past experience. Because of
the relative ease with which its content is understood
and comprehensible, the term "trading or commercial
activity" has been adopted for convenience' sake as a
starting point. Not unlike other terms which require
precise definition, the expression has to be further
clarified, as it has earlier received some clarification in
connection with the use of terms in draft article 2, para.
1(f) (Use of terms)SI and further practical guidance in
draft article 3, para. 2 (Interpretative provisions).s2
47. "Trading or commercial activity" has been defined as including not only a particular commercial
transaction or a particular commercial act having a
this case in English, International Legal Materials (Washington,
D.C.), vol. XII, No.1 (1973), p. 182.
SI See footnote 9 above.
S2See footnote 10 above.
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sufficiently close connection with the State of the forum
but also an entire series of acts or transactions which
constitute a regular course of commercial conduct.
Thus a commercial transaction or operation or act or
contract, or the combination of several of such activities, will be considered as forming part of conduct
traditionally associated with trade or commerce. The
idea of profit or speculation is not foreign to trading. It
has sometimes been suggested that a criterion to be
used in identifying or determining a "trading or commercial activity" is the objective nature or character of
the particular act or transaction or course of conduct or
activity, rather than its motivation or p~. This
objective criterion has been proposed as an mitial step,
since in most cases its application is decisive in determining the availability or applicability of State immunity. This is designed to promote precision, to ensure
clarity and to remove uncertainties. It will be seen in
the course of the examination of State practice whether
this initial criterion will need further ramifications, and
to what extent reference to the motive or purpose of a
particular act or transaction will be needed to clarify
what otherwise could appear to be doubtful cases of
State activities that are predominantly non-commercial
in essence and substance, although clearly commercial
in regard to the nature of the transaction involved. A
more detailed examination and the analysis of concrete
cases in actual State practice will afford further guidance in the study of this topic.
48. It will be seen through the evolution of various
case-laws that the same court at different periods and
various courts of different systems have reached different conclusions regarding State immunities in the
context of the exception which is entitled "trading and
commercial activity". It is difficult for the courts to
overlook completely the motivation of a particular
transaction or contract, although its nature is clearly
commercial or that of private law, especially when it is
a contract for the purchase or supply of, for instance,
materials for the establishment of an embassy,S3 construction materials for an army or navy or air force,S4
supplies for the maintenance of an army or a military
basess or food supplies to relieve famine in an area
suffering from natural calamity~/or instance, to assist
victims of flood or earthquake. Hard cases need not
S3See , for example, the ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court
in the Federal Republic of Germany in the case Xv. Empire of. . .
[Iran] (1963) (see footnote 43 above).
S4See, for example, the case Gouvernement espagnol v. Ouaux
849) (Dalloz, RecueiJ periodique et critique de jurisprudence, 1849
Paris), part I, p. 9), concerning the purchase of boots by the Spanish
overnment for the Spanish army. Cf. Hanukiew case (1933)
(Annual Digest . .. , 1933-1934 (London), vol. 7 (1940), case No. 66,
pp. 174-175), concerning the purchase of arms; and various loan
cases, such as the Moroccan Loan, Laurans v. Gouvernement du
Maroc (1934) (Sirey, RecueiJ general des lois et des a"ets,
1935 (Paris). part I, p'p. 103-104. and Revue crilique de droit
international (Darras) (Paris), vol. XXX (1935). p. 795). See also
Vavasseur v. Krupp (1878) (United Kingdom. The Law Reports,
Chancery Division, vol. IX (1878), p. 351).
sSSee, for "example, the case Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd. v.
The Central Bank of Nigeria (1977) (The AU Englalid Law Reports,
1977, vol. I, p. 881) concerning the order of cement for the
construction of barracks in Nigeria. Cf. Gugenheim v. State of
Vietnam (Appeals Court, Paris, 1955) (lnternational Law Reports,
1955 (London), vol. 22 (1958). pp. 224-225) (judgment upheld by the
Cour de Cassation, 1961 (Revue generate de aroit international pUblic
(Paris), vol. 66 (1962),~. 654» concerning the purchase of cigarettes
tor the Vietnamese natIOnal army.
56See , for example, Egyptian Delta Rice Mills Co. v. Comis4ria
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make bad law, although they may serve to obscure
lOme of the finer lines of delineation between cases
where immunity is applicable and those where the court
has preferred to exercise jurisdiction, particularly in the
field of trading. A caveat is therefore lod~ed to emphasize the need to approach certain sensitive areas with
the greatest caution, lest an important act of sovereign
authority to ensure the safety and security of nationals
of a State be misconstrued as a simple commercial
activi'r unclothed with jurisdictional unmunity. This
objective criterion tends to be formal, and at times
mechanical. Although useful and serviceable in most
cases, it may need re-examination at closer ran~e, since
circumstances might require penetration of thIS test.

2. THE CURRENT PRAcneE OF STATES

REGARDING
TRADING OR COMMERCIAL AC11VlTY

49. An inductive approach requires an examination of
State practice on tills particular point of ''trading or
commercial activity", which is regarded as a first exception to State immunity. In any examination of State
practice it is necessary to observe the evolutionary
character of the practice of States in aU related fields
through the passage of time. State practice, like the
evolution of regal principles and norms of international
law, cannot be considered out of context of the time
dimension. Time is an essential dimension, a constituent element of legal rules which are applicable only
durin~ a period which could have a more or less definite
duratIon. The relativity of temporal existence and the
application of a legal norm cannot be overlooked. As
will be seen, in a particular legal system State practice
changes, develops and evolves through time and with
the passage of tIme. The practice of several countries
does not necessarily follow the same pattern of evolution within the same time-frame. On the whole, the
emerJing trends represent the overall picture of State
practIce, judicial and governmental, as well as legislative and treaty practice. The application of the rule on
State immunity is a two-way street in the sense that
each State, each Government, is a potential recipient
or beneficiary of State immunity as well as being in the
position of having to fulfil the obligation to give effect
to jurisdictional immunity enjoyed by another State.
SO. The practice of States, in various forms, reflects
the various factors, elements and developments in the
extensions of functions or roles assumed by States in
the field of economic activities. It will be seen that even
from the very beginning, when the doctrine of State
immunity was first conceived and applied, concern was
voiced and reservation expressed WIth regard to trading
or commercial activities. This was the case even in the
most traditional of State practice favouring what could
be viewed as the most unqualified recognition and
application of State immunity. 57 One of the reasons for
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes de Madrid (1943) (Annual
Digest . .. , 1943-1945 (London), vol. 12 (1949), case No. 27, pp.
103-104), cited in Sucharitkul, loco cit., p. 138 (see footnote 38
above. in fine).
S1See , for example, the dictum of Lord Stowell in The "Swift"
(1813) (J. Dodson, Reports of Oues argued and determined in the
High Court of Admirtilty (London, Butterworth, 1815), vol. I, p.
320);
"The utmost that I can venture to admit is, that, if the King
traded, as some sovereigns do. he m!ght fall within the operation
of these statutes (Navtgation ActsJ. Some sovereigns have a
monopoly of certain commodities, in which they traffick on the
(~",.-".,.")
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allowing immunity to operate even in the earliest cases
bas been the absence of commercial nature of the act or
activities involved. 58 A taint of commercial activity has
been known to disqualify or nUllify a claim of State
immunity. In one of the earliest cases in which the
exception of trading was reco~ed and applied in
State practice,59 the judge, Sir Robert Phillimore,
observed:
... No principle of intemationallaw, and no decided case, and no
dictum of jurists of which I am aware, has gone so far as to authorize
a sovereign prince to assume tbe character of a trader, when it is for
his benefit; and when he incurs an obligation to a private subject to
throw off, if I may so speak, his disguise, and appear as a sovereign,
claiming for his own benefit, and to the injury of a private person, for
the first time, all the attributes of his character. 60

51. It will also be seen that while the proposition that
trading constitutes an exception to State immunity has
encountered relatively little opposition, the actual application of that proposition bas not been without
doubts and hesitations. The same set of facts could be
construed differently by different courts at various
levels with surprisingly divergent or even opposing
results. The same activity could be viewed as trading
not entitled to State immunity or as non-commercial
and therefore covered by State immunity.61

(a) Judicial practice
(i) International adjudication

52. As has been noted, the relativity and uncertainty
of rules of State immunity, especially in respect of the
scope and extent of their application in State practice,
are in some measure accountable for the relative
silence of judicial pronouncements on an international
level. The only case recently decided by the International Court of Justice, in 1980,62 which has a direct
( F _ 57 collti~d.)

common principles that other traders traffick; and, if the King of
England so possessed and so exercised any monopoly, I am not
prepared to say that he must not conform his traffick to the
general rules by which all trade is regulated." (Ibid., p. 339.)
S8For instance, neither in The Schooner "Exchange" v. McFaddon
and others (1812) (W. Cranch, Reports of Cases argued and adjudged
in the Supreme Court of the United States (New York, 1911), vol. VII
(3rd ed." p. 116) nor in The "Prins Frethrik" (1820) (Dodson, op.
cit., vol. II (1815-1822), p. 451) was the ship in question a commercial vessel employed in commercial services.
S9The "Charkieh" (1873) (United Kingdom, The Law Reports,
High Court of Admiralty and Ecclesiastical Courts, vol. IV (1875), p.
59) was the first case where the commercial nature of the service or
employment of a public ship was held to disentitle her from State
immunities.
60 Ibid., pp. 99-100. This decision, with Sir Robert Phillimore's
instructive judgment, was cited with approval by an absolutist writer,
C. F. Gabba, "De la competence des tribunaux a l'egard des
souverains et des Etats etrangers", Journal de droit international
prive (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 16 (1889), p. 539, and ibid., vol. 17
(1890), p. 41. Cf. also his decision in The "Parlement beige" (1879)
(United Kingdom, The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1879, vol. IV,
p. 129).
61The Parlement beige itself (see footnote 60 above) was considered by Sir Robert Phillimore, after reviewing English and American cases, as being "neither a I?ublic ship of war nor a private vessel
of pleasure", and thus not entitled to immunity. This decision. was
reversed by the Court of Appeal (1880) (United Kingdom, The Law
Reports, Probate Division,188O, vol. V, p. 197); see Lord Justice
Brett (ibid., p. 203).
62See the Judgment of the ICJ of 24 May 1980, United States
DiplomtJlic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3,
mentioned in the Special Rapporteur's second report (Yearbook . ..

bearing on the 'luestion of inviolability rather than the
usual type of junsdictional immunity of State property,
did not touch upon the exception of trading or commercial activity connected with the premises of the embassy
or the consulate. This may serve to illustrate the
flexible nature of attitudes and positions of Governments. By not pursuing the matter on the international
level, a State affected by an adverse judicial decision of
a foreign court may remain silent at the risk of acquiescing in the judgment or the treatment given.
States are none the less further protected by the
second-sta~e immunity from seizure, attachment and
execution m respect of their property once a judgment
has been rendered or obtained which may affect them
adversely. The relative paucity of judicial orders requiring execution may account for the absence of
international litigation or adjudication. This does not
preclude the existence of a rule of law on the subject.
(ii) Judicial decisions of municipal courts
53. An inductive approach to State practice on this
particular issue of "t~ading <?r commercial activity" ~ an
exception to State tmmuDlty has to be systematic as
well as analytical, rather than historical or chronological. Inescapably, however, the relevance of time-span or
time-frame, the temporal dimension, is often indicative
if not determinative of the progressive phase of legal
developments. An examination of the practice of each
State may indicate a progressive development at different paces, backward as well as forward, not altogether
uniriftuenced br other relevant and material factors
such as econOmIC restructuring or political upheavals in
a particular State or region. Case-law in each country
tends to grow and evolve, bringing about changes and
novelties that may for a time prevail. The current
judicial practice may be said to point towards a clear
reaffirmation of the exception of "trading or commercial activity" as fully endorsed by judicial decisions, and
firmly reinforced if not directly assisted sometimes by
national legislation, or even bilateral treaties and international or regional conventions.
54. State practice has continued to move in favour of
a generally restrictive trend since the advent of State
trading and the continuing expansion of State activities
in the field of economic development. The epithet
"absolute" in respect of immunity was unknown at the
inception of the principles of State immunity. State
practice, even at the very beginning, was never absolute, but carefully selected the categories of cases in
which foreign States were immune, viz., foreign
sovereigns, ambassadors, the passage of foreign armed
forces or warships.63 Trading was theoretically outside
1980, vol. II (Part One), p. 227, document A/CN.4/331 and Add.I,
para. 114); cf. the Permanent Court's decision of 15 June 1939 in
Societe commerciale de Belgique, P.C.I.J., Series AI B, No. 78, p.

160.
63 See, e.g., Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner "Exchange" v.
McFaddon and others (1812) (Cranch, op. cit., P. 137-139, (see
footnote 58 above», who gave three instances 0 exception to the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction:
(1) The exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest and
detention within a foreign territory;
.
(2) The immunity which al\ civilized nations allowed to foreign
ministers; and
(3) The implied cession of a portion of his territorial jurisdiction
where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his
dominion.

f
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the operation of the doctrine of State immunity even at
the very start ,64 although in the actual application of the
general rule of State immunity, differing tnterpretations
have been given to the same or similar type of State
activities by various courts in the same and other
countries at various times. The movement of State
practice in its progressive evolution may be likened to
that of a snake, which can move sideways by swinging
and swaying its body to the left and right, with intermittent ups-and-downs in zig-zagging pattern.
55. Thus the case-law of countries such as Italy,
Belgium and Egypt, which could be said to have led the
field of "restrictive immunity", denying immunity in
regard to trading activities, may now have been overtaken by the recent practice of countries traditionally
for a more unqualified doctrine of State immunity, such
as the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States
of America and the United Kingdom. The restrictive
trenc;ls appear to prevail in every direction, with the
result that the exception of "trading or commercial
activity" may be said to have become firmly ensconced
as a well-settled and established practice of customary
international law. It is the first step of minimum exception, although not always unchallenged as a matter
of practical necessity nor generally free from theoretical and doctrinal controversies. It should be emphasized, none the less, that the challenge to "trading or
commercial activity" as an exception to State immunity
has come from certain quarters as a matter of policy or
principle without an,}' evidence of contrary practice in
terms of judicial deCIsions. Views of Governments are
certainly r~levant, and could influence legal developments in their own right. They may indeed provide a
lead for judicial decisions in certain areas, as they have
done in some countries where consent and reciprocity
play a prominent role or where the determination of
State immunity is considered as a responsibility shared
by the courts and the political arms of the Government.
The primary concern of this particular section of the
re~rt is the current evidence of judicial practice, a
bnef general survey of which on this point deserves
close attention and careful examination. It should be
observed at this point that the present inquiry is not
confined to the practice of industrialized countries of
the Western world, but is intended to cover all States
generally. In any event, the Special Rapporteur is not
expected to su,?plement want of judicial decisions with
his own inventions or speculations.

Italy
56. The States which in practice appear to have
recognized trading or commercial activIt.}' as an exception to State immunity from the very begtnning include
Italy, Belgium and Egypt. The courts of Italy were the
first, in 1882, to limit the application of State immunity
to cases where the foreign State has acted as an "ente
64 According to Chief Justice Marshall (ibid., p. 145): "A prince, by
acquiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be
considered as subjecting that property to the temtorial jurisdiction" .
When a sovereign "descended into the market place, he should be
treated on a par with a private trader" (quoted in the Harvard draft,
oI'. cit., p. 473). See also Bank ofth~ Unit~d Stcll~S v. Plant~rs' Bank
of G~rgiIJ (1824) (H. Wheaton, R~ports of Cas~ arg~d and
lIIIirui~din the Suprmte Court of the Unued Suues (New York, 1911),
vol. IX, 4th cd., pp. 904 and 9(7).

politico" as opposed to a "corpo morale" ,65 or in the
capacity of a sovereign authority or political power
(Potere politico) as distinguished from a persona civile.
State immunity was accorded only in respect of "atti
d'impero", and not "atti di gestione".66 The public
nature of a State act was a criterion by which immunity
was determined. Immunity was not recognized for
private acts or acts of private law nature. 67 It was not
unnatural that commercial activities of a foreign Government answering various denominations of the types
of activities not covered by State immunity on the basis
of the various distinctions made were held to constitute
an exception to State immunity. 68
57. In a case decided by the Court of Appeal of
Genoa in 1925, the French Government was held
responsible in respect of a contract to tow ships from
Cattaro to La Spezia, apparently one of private law
nature to be performed in Italy. "When a foreign State
engapes in a purely commercial activity,* and, in the
admmistration of its property, operates more et jure
privatorum", said the Court, "it appears to be no
different from any foreign juristic person."69 The current 'practice of Italian couns follows the same line of
restnctive principles, confining immunity to atti di
sovranita. Thus, tn a more recent case decided in 1955
concerning a United States military base established in
Italy in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, the
Court of Cassation granted immunity in respect of
"l'attivitcl pubblicistica" connected with the "funzioni
pubbliche 0 politiche" of the United States
Government. 70 Later decisions confirmed the application of such distinctions, holding, in one case, an
employee of an overseas office of the United States
Information Agency to be "un ente od ufficio statale

americano . .. che agisce all'estero sotto la direzione ed
il controllo del Segretario di Stato . . . per la persecuzione di r.ni pubblici sovrani dello Stato americana
come tale' to be an "impiegato di uno Stato" and "per
dejinizione impiegato pubblico",11 and, in another case,
holding the employment by the Romanian Government
of an employee of an economic agency forming an
65 Mor~ll~tv. Gov~mo Dan~~ (1882) (see footnote 32 above); cited
in the Harvard draft, op. cit., pp. 481-482.
66Guttieres v. Elmilik (1886) (see footnote 34 above). See also
Hamspohn v. B~y di Tunisi (1887) (see footnote 35 above) and
TypaidCIs, Console di Gr~cia v. Manicomio di Av~rsa (1886) (see
footnote 37 above).
"Carlo d'AustriIJ v. Nobili (1921) (see footnote 42 above). Cf.
P~rucch~tti v. Puig y Casarauno (1928) (see footnote 43 above).
68Stor~lli v. Gov~mo della R~pubblica Franc~e (1924) (see foot·
note 47 above) and the Ttsini case (1924) (see footnote 49 above).
69Gov~rno Franc~s~ v. S~"a ~d aitri (1925) (Rivista di dimto
int~rnazional~ (Rome), 17th year, series III, vol. IV (1925), p. 540):
"Quando uno Stato estero estrinseca una attivita meramente patrimoniale, e, amministrando i suoi beni, opera mor~ ~t jur~ privatorum,
non altrimenti esso appare che Quale persona giuridica straniera"
(cited and trans. in the Harvard draft, op. cit., p. 480). Cf., on the
other hand, F. .Advokaat v. I. Schuddinck eft den Belgisch~n Staat
(1923) (see footnote 41 above), where the Netherlands court held a
service of tug boats to be an act of public administration.
7\) D~partment of the .Army of th~ United Srat~ ot Am~rica v. Gori
Sav~llini (1955) (Rivista di dirino internazional~ (Milan), vol. XXXIX
(1956), p'p. 91-92, and Int~nuuional Law R~ports, 1956 (London),
vol. 23 (l960),p. 201). Cf. La M~rcantil~ v. R~gno di Gr~ciIJ (1955)
(Rivista di diritto int~rnazional~ (Milan), vol. XXXVIII (1955), p.
376, and Int~r1Ultio1Ul1 Law R~ports. 1955 (London), vol. 22 (1958).

p.240).
71 D~ Ritis v. Gov~rno d~gli Stati Uniti d'Am~rica (1971) (Rivista di
dirilto internazional~ (Milan), vol. LV (1972), pp. 483, at 485-486).

---~--------
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integral part of the Romanian Embassy in Italy to be of
a non-commercial character. 72
Belgium
58. The Belgian case-law was settled as early as 1857
in a trilogy of cases involving the guano monopoly of
Peru. 73 A distinction was drawn between public and
private activities of the State, and the Court of Appeal
of Brussels was able to deny immunity in respect of
activities connected With the business enterprise of
Peru. Trading activities have since been regarded as an
area where no immunity would be allowed. Thus, in
another later case decided by the Court of Appeal of
Gent in 1879,74 the court refused the claim of immunity
in an action for freight on guano shipped for Ostend.
The principles on which sovereign immunity was based
were not considered violated if the foreign Government
engaged in commercial contracts. The court said: .
... this principle [of the sovereignty of nations] may indeed be
applicable when a government, within the limit of its functions as a
government,· takes measures in the interest of its preservation or for
activities dictated by the general interest, but there can no longer be
any question of it being applicable when a government sells guano
and, either directly or through intermediaries, takes actions and
enters into contracts which, always and everywhere, have been
considered to be commercial contracts,· subject to the jurisdiction of
commercial courts; ...75

59. This limitation concerning State trading has been
followed in a number of subsequent decisions, such as
one in a case concerning the selling of supplies to the
Ottoman Government in 191076 and, another, the
purchase of goods by a forei~n Government for the
purpose of resale on commercial lines to its nationals,
m 1927. 77 Like the Italian courts, the Belgian courts
since 1888 also have adopted the distinction between
acts of the State in its sovereign (public) and civil
(private) capacity, holding that, in concluding a contract for the purchase of bullets, Bulgaria acted as a
private person and subjected itself to all the civil
consequences of the contract. 78 Similarly, a contract to
enlarge a railway station in Holland was held amenable
to Belgian jurisdiction in 1903, not so much on account
of any theory of consent, express or implied, but on the
72LufUJ v. Repubblica socialisUl di Romania (1974) (ibid., vol.
LVIII (1975), p. 597).
73The three cases were the following:
(1) Elal du perou v. Kreglinger (1857) (La Belgique judiciaire
(Brussels), vol. XVII (1859), p. 331). Cf. E. W. Allen, The Position
of Foreign SUlles before 13elgian Courts (New York, Macmillan,
1929). See also the decision of the Court of Appeal of Brussels of 30
December 1840 in the case Sociele generale pour favoriser I'industrie
IIDlionale v. Syndical d'amortissement, Gouvernemenl neerlandais
el Gouvernement beige (Pasicrisie beige, 1841 (Brussels), part 2,
p.33).
(2) "Peruvian Loans" case (1877) (La Belgique judiciaire (Brussels), vol. XXV (1877), p. 1185). The case was brought not against
Peru but its exclusive agent for the sale of guano in Europe, the
Dreyfus Brothers, of Paris.
(3) Peruvian Guano Company v. Dreyfus et consorts el Ie
Gouvemement du perou (1880) (ibid., vol. XXXIX (1881), p.
1394).
74The Havre case: Rau, Vanden Abeele el Cie v. Duruty (1879)
(Pasicrisie beige, 1879 (B~ls),part 2, p. 175).
75Ibid., p. 176: cited in the Harvard draft, op. Cil., p. 613.
76Gouvememenl imperial ottoman v. Gaspary (1910) (Pasicrisie
beige, 1911 (Brussels), part 3, p. 105).
77 Monnoyer el Bernard v. EUlI franrais (1927) (see footnote 38
above).
78 Sodile

pour la fabricalion de CIIr/ouches v. Colonel MUlkuroff,

"nature of the act· and the capacity in which the State is
involved in it". 79 The distinction between acta jure
imperii and acta jure gestionis has been recognized by
Belgian courts since 190~ and has been consistently
applied in subsequent cases_ 81
Egypt
60. The Mixed Courts of E~t were consistent in
their adherence to the Italo-Bel~an practice of limited
immunity. As early as 1920, a distinction between acts
jure gestionis and jure imperii was recognized. In an
action for damages for maritime collision involving a
vessel belonging to the British Crown, the Mixed Court
of Appeal of Alexandria denied the plea of immunity
"invoked by the State· , which acted· purely as a simple
individual or a civil person·".82 In a long line of cases,
immunity was not allowed in respect of commercial
transactions. Thus the renting of a furnished villa was
held, in a 1927 case, to be a "contrat de droit prive" as
opposed to an "acte de puissance publ~ue".83 The
operation of a State Railways Administration was also
considered in a 1942 case to be an act of private.
administration as opposed to an "acte de
souverainete".84 The courts applied an objective criterion of the "nature of the transaction" very strictly in
denying immunity in respect of trading activities, holding the activities of the two organs of the Spanish
Government to be "undertakings of a commercial
character."85 A contract for the purchase of an immovable property to be used as an "hOtel diplomatique" was
also regarded as an "acte de gestion" and therefore
subject to local jurisdiction. 86 Whether a State enterprise was separately incorporated or was integrated
mto the machinery of government of the foreign State,
if its activity was that of a commercial enterprise having
the character of a private undertaking, such as the
ministre de la guerre de la principaule de Bu/garie (1888) (see footnote
36 above).
79 Sociele anonyme des chemins de fer Jiegeois-Iuxembourgeois v.
EUlI neerlandllis (Minislere du WalersUlaI) (1903) (Pasicrisie beige,
1903 (Brussels), part 1, p. 294); cited in the Harvard draft, op. cil.,
Pf' 613-614. See also the decision of the Tribunal civil de Bruxelles
o 22 May 1901 (Journal des tribufUJUX belges (Brussels), 1901, p.
1127), where the court upheld jurisdiction and applied article 92 of
the COnstitution.
MlFeidman v. EUlI de Bahia (1907) (see footnote 38 above).
81 See, for example, Dhellemes el Masurel v. Banque centrale
de la Re1!ublique de Turquie (1963) (Journal des tribunaux belges
(Brussels), 19 January 1964, p. 44); and Socobelge el Elal beige v.
Etal hellenique, Banque de Grece, el Banque de Bruxelles (1951)
(JourfUJl due droil inlernalional (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 79 (1952), pp.
244-266, notes of A. Deveze and M. R. Hennebicq). See also E. Suy,
"L'immunite des Etats dans la jurisf.!rudence beIge", L'immunite de
juridiclion el d'execulion des EUlts (Brussels. Institut de socioloj!ie,
1971), pp. 279 el seq.; and L. Plouvier, "L'immunite de contramte
des Communautes europl!ennes", Revue beige de droit internalional
(Brussels), vol. IX (1973), p. 471.
82The S.S. "Sumatra" case (1920) (see footnote 39 above).
83 Zaki bey Gabra v. R. E. Moore Esq. el aUlre (1927) (see footnote
39 above).
84 Gouvernement egyptien v. Chemins de fer de I' Elal paieslinien
(1942) (Bulletin de legislation el de jurisprudence egypliennes (Alexandria), vol. 54 (1941-1942), part 2, p. 242).
85 Egyptian DelUl Rice Mills Co. v. Comisarla General de Abaslecimientos y Transpor/es de Madrid (1943) (see footnote 56 above). The

Mixed Courts were wound up in 1949.

86S. E. Echref BadnjeviC es qua/ile de Ministre de Yougoslavie en
Egypre v. W. R. Fanner (1947) (Journal du droit intemtUionai
(aunet) (Paris), vols. 73-76 (1946-1949), p. 113).
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National Saving Bank of France, the courts were
prepared to exerciSt. jurisdiction. 87
61. The current case-law of post-war Egypt has confirmed the jurisprudence of the Mixed Courts. Jurisdictional immunities of foreign States constitute a question
of "ordre public", or a matter of public policy.88
Immunity IS only accorded in respect of acts of
sovereign authoriiy89 and does not extend to "ordinary
acts" which are not related to the exercise of sovereignty and "commercial acts".90
France
62. Earlier French case-law was more inclined towards unlimited immunity. In the famous case decided
in 1849 concerning the purchase of boots by the Spanish
90ve~ment for the. Spanis.h army, the court, basing
lDlmumty on the reCiprocal mdependence of soverei$n
States, defined jurisdiction as "a right inherent in Its
sovereign authority, which another government cannot
arrogate to itself without running the risk of adversely
~e~tin~ their respective relati~ns" .91 The attempted
distmctlOn between "Etat pUISsance pub/ique" and
"Etat personne privee" was rejected throughout the
19th century.92 As late as 1912, the Court of Appeal of
Paris still rejected the dual personality of the State. The
court said:
~o distinction should be made between the . . . public personality
which would not be subject to foreign jurisdiction and the legal
personality which would, on the contrary, be subject to it, since all
the acts of a State can have only one goal and one end, which are
always political, and its unity precludes such dualism. 93

63. Amidst a general confusion created by longstanding controversies of theoretical importance
between the Cour de Cassation and inferior courts
notably the Cour d' Ap~1 de Paris, as regards the tru~
nature of State immunity94 as "immunite de juridiction"
trT Borg v. Caisse nationale d'epargne frarlfaise (1926) (Gaune des
tribunaux mutes d'Egypte (Alexandria), vol. 16, No. 185 (March
1926), p. 123); (Annual Digest 1925-1926 (London), vol. 3 (1929),

case No. 122, p. 171).
88See the reply of Egypt to question 3 of the questionnaire
addressed to Governments in 1979, in United Nations, Materillls on
Jurisdictional Immunities ... , p. 569: and decision 1173 of 1963 of
the Cairo Court of First Instance, published on 8 June 1964.
f91dem, and the decisions of 29 March 1943 of the Tribunal de
Commerce of Alexandria, of 12 May 1951 of the Civil Court of
Alexandria and of 10 March 1960 of the Giza Court of First Instance.
~See the. reply of Egypt to question 7 of the questionnaire, in
Untted Nattons, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities ... , p. 569.
91 Gouvemement espagnol v. Casaux (1849) (see footnote 54
above). See, for example, E. W. Allen, The Position of Foreign Suues
before French Courts (New York, Macmillan, 1929); and Hamson,
Ioc. cit., p. 293 (see footnote 40 above).
92 See , for example, Ministere public v. DemoiseUe Masset (1870)
(Dallal, Recueil periodique et critique de jurispnu:lence 1871 (Paris),
part 2, p. 9), concerning the Tsar of Russia; Htri.tiers de I'empereur
MaximiJitn v. Lemaitre (1872) (ibid., 1873, part 2, p. 24), concerning
the Em~ror Maximilien of Mexico; Isabelle de Bourbon v. Me/lerio
(1872) (ibid., 1872, part 2, p. 124), concerning the ex-Queen of Spain
tsabeUa II; Witrcinski v. Seyyid Ali bert Hamond (1916) (JoUl7Ul! du
~it international (aunet), (Paris), vol. 44 (1917), p. 1465"), concernmg the ex-Sultan of Zanzibar.
93 Gamen-Humbert v. Euu russe (1912) (Dallal, Recueil plriodique
et critique de jurispnu:lence, 1913 (paris), part 2, p. 201, note by G.
Gidel); the judgment was no doubt inspired by the decision of the
Prussian Court of Jurisdictional Conflicts in Hellfeld v. den Fiskus des
russischen Reiches (Zeitschrift far IfIlemlllioluUes Recht (see footnote
120 below).
94~e J: P. Niboyet, ."Immunite de juridiction et inco~tence
d'aunbutton", Revue cruique de droit interNIIionai priv# (Pans), vol.
XXXIX (1950), p. 139.

or "incompetence d'attribution", later French case-law
atteml?ted to qualify "immunite de juridiction" by
confirimg immunity to cases in which the defendant
acted in a capacity different from that of a State, such as
an agent or mandataire of one of its nationals,9S or a
universal legatee ,96 and to restrict "incompetence d'attrlbution" on account of the function fulfilled, granting
immunity only "ratione nu:derille". f17 French courts have
in fact applied both theories concurrently so that
immunity· has been denied either ratione personae
because of the non-sovereign capacity or qualitl in
which the State acts, or ratione materille because 0 the
nature of the act in question. The overriding test
preferred by the Cour de Cassation of "incompetence
tI'attribution", or "the nature of the act" , has served to
confine State immunity to State acts commonly designated as "actes de puissance publique, de ,ouvemement, d'autorite, desouverainete, d'imperium' or "actes
politiques" as opposed to "actes de commerce".98
64. Traces of certain limitations based on the distinction between the State as "puissance publique" and as
"personne privee'" and between "acte d'autorite" and
"acte de gestion" or "acte de commerce" could be found
in the judgments of lower courts as early as 1890. 99 It
was not until 1918 that a restrictive theory of immunity
was formulated and adopted by French tribunals.
Accepting the functional limitation of State immunity,
the Cour d' Appel de Rennes declined jurisdiction in a
case on the ground that the vessel was employed "not
for a commercial purpose and for private interests, but
... for the requirements of national defence, beyond
any idea of profit or speculation . . ." .100 The first case
in which the restrictive theory was applied with the
result of non-immunity was the Lakhowsky case, decided in 1919, concerning the activities of the Office
Suisse des Transports Ext~rieurs, holding the contract
for the purchase of goods to be transported into
Switzerland to be a commercial transaction, an "acte de
9SSee the Vestwig case: Procureur ~neral pres fa Cour de cassation
v. Vestwig et autres (1946) (Sirey, Recueil general des lois et des Qrrets ,
1947 (Paris), ~rt I, p. 137); Credit foncitr d'Alserie et de Tunisie v.
Restrepo et aepartement d'Antioqu/Q (1922) (Annual Di8est ...
1919-1922 (London), vol. 1 ~1932), case No. 201, p. 285), for an
action against the charge d affaires of Colombia; see also the
conclusions of Judge L. Lyon-Caen (La Gazene du PaJais (Paris,
1923), 1st semester, p. 439).
96 Euu roumain v. Demoiselle Arricllstre et aUlres (Tribunal civil of
Bordeaux, 1937) (Revue critique de droit international (Paris), vol.
XXXIII (1938), p. 297, with a note by H. Batillol, p. 3(0); (Court of
A~al of Paitiers, 1946) (Journal au droit international (Clunet)
(Pans), vols. 7~76 (194&-1949), p. 6); Htri.tiers de Plessis-BeUrere v.

Uon XI11, pape, comte RDmpo/lo ... (Tribunal civil of Momdidier,
1892) (Journal de droit international prive (aunet) (Paris), vol. 19
(1892), p. 447); (Cour d'~l of ~e!ls, 18(3) (ibid., vol. io (1893),
p. 384); (Cour de cassanon, 1894) (ibid., vol. 21 (1894), p. 835).
97 Epoux Martin v. Banque d'Espagne (1952) (ibid., vol. 80 (1953),
p. 654); see also Banque d'Espagne IJe Bur~os v. Ba~ue d'Espagne
IJe BarceloM et Banque de France (1938) (ibid., vol. 66 (1939), p. 70).
-See, for exam=e, a note by J. B. Sialelli concerning the case
Epoux Martin v.
ue d'Espa M (1952) (Ioc. cit., pp. 656-657see footnote 97 above; the
of J. P. Niboyet,loc. cit., p. 139

artie£:

(see footnote 94 above); a note by C. Rousseau concerning the

HanuJciew case (1933) (Ioc. cit., p. 24~ footnote 54 above); and
• note by N. Politis concerning .tb~ case Epoux Dessus v. Epoux
Rieoy (1907) (DaIlOl, RecudJ pIrioaique et critique de jurisprudence,
1907 (Paris), part 2, p. 281).
99 Faucon et Cit v. Gouvemement grec (1890) (Journal du droit
international prive (aunet) (Paris), vol. 17 (1890), p. 288).
loo"Hunger/ord" case (1918) (1919) (see footnote 50 above).
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commerce" subject to local jurisdiction. lol On appeal,
in 1921, the Cour d'Appel de Paris did not fuid the
contract to be of commercial nature, not having a "but
commercial", and that the transaction "was motivated
by concerns of international interest and domestic
policy excluding anJ profit-seeking and any idea of
speculation· ... "" It was not until 1924, however,
that the Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille was able
to hold the activities of a foreign Government amenable to French jurisdiction, characterizing the contract
of purchase of goods to be resold to its nationals on
ordinary commercial lines as a "commercial transaction", forming part of the trading activities of the
foreign Government. The operation of acts denominated "actes de commerce" "excludes any consideration
concerning the exercise of the State's ~ublic authority,
its independence and its sovereignty". 03
65. The ex\,ression "actes de commerce" was used in
this connectIon not in its technical sense of French
procedure allocating jurisdiction between civil and
commercial cases, but in the sense of "commercial
transaction" or "trading activity". French courts as well
as contemporary French commentators ap~ar to have
preferred this term because it is convement, appropriate and familiar: "with it one is on relatively firm and
familiar ground" .104 This theory of "acte de commerce"
has inftuenced the main development in French caselaw. A restrictive view of immunity based on this
theory has been adopted in a long line of cases decided
by the ugper courts, especially in the so-called "Soviet
cases", I starting in 1926 with the authorization of a
saisie-arret by the Cour de Cassation against the assets
of the Soviet Trade Delegation. 106 The Court observed:
Transactions of a commercial character extending to all fields can
only be regarded as ordinary commercial transactions having nothing
in common with the principle of sovereignty of States. 107

66. The current jurisprudence of France may be said
to be settled in its adherence ot the restrictive principle
101 Lokhowsky v. Office suisse des transports exterieurs (Tribunal de
commerce de la Seine, 1919) (Revue de droit international prive
(Darras) (Paris), vol. XVII (1921), p. 70). Immunity was limited to
"activities being sovereign in nature or administrative activities,
activities of public authority" (ibid., p. 72).
Il12lbid., vol. XVIII (1922-1923), pp. 746-747.
103 Etat roumain v. Pascalet et Cie (1924) (Journal du droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 52 (1925), p. 113; J. P. Niboyet, Traite de
droit international prive fran~ais (Paris, Sirey, 1949), vol. VI, part 1,
p.3465·
IIWThus Niboyet observed in his Traite (op. cit.), vol. VI, part 1, p.
350. He also s81d, in reply to E. Umonon, Rapporteur for the topic
of immunity of foreign States from jurisdiction and measures of
execution at the Sienna meeting of the Institute of International Law
(April 1952): "I feel it would be better to use the term acte de
commerce, which is more in keeping with the modem activity. of the
State ... " (Annuaire de 1'Institut de droit international, 1952 (Basel),
vol. 44, part I, pp. 1~131).
I05See, for example, S. Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading
Activities in International Low (London, Stevens, 1959), pp. 152-161;
Hamson, loc. cit., pp. 309 et seq. (see footnote 40 above); and A.
Stoupnitzky, "Le statut de l'URSS-COmmer~ant dans Ie droit
conventionnel sovietique", Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee (Paris), vol. XVII (1936), p. SOl.

I06Societe Ie Gostorg et Representation commerciale de I'URSS V.
Association France-Export (1926) (Sirey, Recueil general des lois et
des arrtts, 1930 (Paris), part 1, p. 49; summary and trans. in Annual
Digest . .. , 1925-1926 (London). vol. 3 (1929), case No. 125, p. 174).
1071bid., p. 175; see also Sirey, Recueil general . .. , pp. 49-50 for a
note by Niboyet; and Dalloz periodique ... 1929 (Pans), part 1, p.
75, for a note by R. Savatier. See also J. G. Castel, "Immunity of a
foreign State from execution: French practice", The American Journal ollntemational Low (Washington, D.C.), vol. 46 (1952), p. 520.

based on "trading activities". The more recent decisions of the last two or three decades serve to illustrate
the difficulties inherent in the actual application of the
theory of the "acte de commerce", with curiously
divergent results. Thus, the purchase of cigarettes for a
foreign armyl08 and a contract for the survey of water
distribution in Pakistan lO9 were held to be "actes de
puissance publique" for "service public", while a contract of commercial lease of an office for a tourist
organization of a forei~ Government llO and the
method of raising of pubhc loanslll gave rise to unending doubts and Ilesitations. Government guarantee of
rents was regarded as an exercise of public authority, 112
as was the regulation of exchange control by a central
bank.l13 Oearly, in principle, immunity was confined to
acts of public authority, "actes de puissance publique",
or acts performed in the interest of a public service. It is
based on the nature of activity as distmct from the status
of the entity which performs it. A rail transport was
held to be within the category of "commercial activities" not entitled to State immunity. 114 The practical
difficulty is likely to continue, with fluctuating results
ranging from the exercise of jurisdiction to assess the
adequacy of com~nsation given by a forei~n government for expropnationllS to the leasing of lmmovable
properties and the floating of public loans. 116

Federal Republic of Germany
67. The practice of German courts has followed a
somewhat zigzag course. It began as early as 1885 with
restrictive immunity based on the distinction between
public and private law activities, holding State immunlty to "suffer at least certain exceptions". 117 Between
1905 and 1938, a more unlimited doctrine of immunity
prevailed. The restrictive trend was reversed in a case
concerning the Belgian State Railway in 1905 118 and the
Finnish State Railway in 1925,119 and the distinction
I(JJGugenheim

V.

State of Vietnam (1955) (1961): see footnote 55

above.

I!1JSociete Transshipping V. Federation of Pakistan (1966) (International Law Reports (London), vol. 47 (1974). p. 150).
110Etat espagnol V. Societe anonyme de I'Hotel Gtorge V (1970)
(ibid., vol. 52 (Cambridge, 1979), p. 317).
111 Montefiore V. Congo beige (1955) (ibid., 1955 (London), vol. 22
(1958), p. 226).
1J2 Societe immobiliere des Cites /leuries Lafayette v. United States of
America (1960) (International Law Reports (London), vol. 42 (1971),
pp. 123-124).
113 Zavicha

Blagojevic V. Banque du Japon (1974) (Annuaire frande droit international, 1975 (Paris), vol. XXI, p. 1040).
des chemins de fer du Gouvernement iranien V.
Socitte Levant Express Transport (1969) (International Law Reports

~ais

11 4 Administration

(Cambridge), vol. 52 (1979), p. 315).
115 Corporacion del Cobre v. Braden Copper Corporation et Societe
Le groupement d'importation des metaux (1972) and commentary by
D. Yiannopoulos (see footnote 50 above, in fine).
116 See , for example, Sir Ian Sinclair, "The law of sovereign
immunity: Recent developments", Recueil des cours ... 1980--11
(Alphen aan den Rijn, Si)thoff and Noordhoff, 1981). vol. 167, pp.
170--175.
1J7 Heizer V. Kaiser-Franz-Joseph-Bahn A. G. (1885) (Gesetz-und
Verordnungsblan fur das Konigreich Bayern (Munich). vol. I (1885),
pp. 15-16), cited in the Harvard draft, op. cit., pp. 533-534. See also
E. W. Allen, The Position of Foreign States be/ore German Courts
(New York, Macmillan, 1928).
118 Bardorf V. Belgische Staats-und Eisenbahnfiskus (1905) (Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (Leipzig), vol. 62
(1906), p. 165).

119Gehrckens

V.

Jiirnviigsstylrelsen (1925) (Hanseatische Rechts-
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ciDl, industrial or financial fields·"}36 The type of
p'ractical difficulties encountered by the courts was
illustrated in the judgment of a more recent case
decided in 1968,137 where the Court of ~ of The
Hague reversed the decision of the District Court and
uptield jurisdiction, holding that the National Iranian
Oil Company (NIOC) did not perform an act which ex
jure must be regarded as a pure act of JOvemment.
71. The exception of trading activities was more
clearly stated b~ the Hoge Raad (Netherlands Supreme
Court) in 1973. 38 It was identified with relative ease in
cases where "a foreigll State engages in trade as an
ordinary enterprise". The Supreme Court explained
that the restrictive trend has been induced by the fact
"that in many States the Government bas increasingly
deployed its activities in areas of society where the
relations are governed by private law, and where,
consequently, the State enters into a leu! relationship
on an equal footing with individuals" .1!9
Austria
72. The practice of Austrian courts has followed a
~tinct ~gzag path, starting with unqualified immunity
~ th~ mnet~nth century, an~ changlOg over to restrictive unmumty from 1907 unt1l1926, when unrestricted
immunity was once again revived and followed, until
1950, when a more solid doctrine of restricted immunity was adopted which has been applied with
consistency ever since. The Supreme Court of Austria,
in a case decided in 1950,140 reviewed existing authorities ~n ir:tternat!onal la~ before reaching a ~nclusion
denylOg Immumty, statlOg that "these authonties show
that the exemption from Itational jurisdiction of acta
g~tionis of foreign States is no longer generally recogruzed and consequently no longer part of international
law". The Court went on to say:
This subjection of the Delli gestionis to the jurisdiction of States has
its basis in the development of the commercial activity of States. The
classic doctrine of immunity arose at a time when aU the commercial
activities of States in foreign countries were connected with their
political activities ... Today the position is entirely diiferent; States
~age in commercial activities and . . . enter into competition with
their own nationals and with foreigners. Ac:cordin&Iy. the classic

I)6Nederlllndse Rijnbank, Amsterdam v. Miihlig Union, TeplitzScM1UIu (1947) (Na-oorlogse Rechtspraak (Zwollen). vol. 3 (1947),
No. 990; Annual Digest . .. ,1947 (London), vol. 14 (1951), case No.
27, p. 78).
137 N. V. Cabolem v. Nati01Ulilranum Oil Company (1968) (Nederltm4se Jurisprudentie (Zwollen, 1969), No. 484; English trans. in
UDlted Nations, Materials on Jurisdictio1Ul1 immunities . .. , pp. 344

et seq.).
I38Socittt europtenne d'ttudes et d'entreprises en liquidation volonlaire v. Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1973) (Netherlands
Yearbook of Inter1ltlti01Ul1 Law, 1974 (Leyden), vol. V, p. 290,
reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdicti01Ul1lmmunities
... , pp. 355 et seq.).
139 Netherlands Yearbook . .. , p. 293; United Nations, Materials
. . . , p. 357. See also Voskuil, loc. cit., p. 306 (see footnote 43 above,
in fine).
1110 Dralle V. Republic of Czechoslovakia (Osterreichische Juristen
Zeitung (Vienna), vol. 5 (1950), p. 341, case No. 356; InternaJio"ai
Law Reports, 1950 (London), vol. 17 (1956), p. 155, case No. 41;
JO!'r1ItIl du droit internaJi01Uli (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 77 (1950), p. 747);
this case has become a leading case Cited outside Austria. The text of
the decision of the Austrian Supreme Court is reproduced in English
trans. in United Nations, MaJeritlJs 011 JurisdictioMllnuruuUJies. . .,
pp. 183 et seq.

doctrine of immunity bas lost its meaning, and, ratione cessanre, can
DO Joaaer be recopized as a rule of international law .141

73. The principles enunciated in 1950 have been
further refined in subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court.142 A business undertaking owned by a foreign
Government was obliged to confonn its activities to
IocaI regulations. State immunity was not available. 143
In a case decided in 1961 144 the Supreme Court, citing
practice of States and opiniones doctorum, concluded
that the distinction between the performance of
sovereign rilhts by the State and its entry into "a
private Iegaf relationship" was practical and not too
difficult to make. "The solution. . . would be to take as
a criterion not the ultimate purpose of the act but its
inherent nature. In order for the nature of the act to be
such as will afford its complete jurisdictional immunity,
th~ act rr:tus~ '?e one which ~uld not ~ perfonned by a
private mdlVJdual. "145 It IS the act Itself and not its
purpose that is decisive of the question of State immunIty.

United States of America
74. It has sometimes been said that the practice of the
courts of the United States of America started with an
unqualified principle of State immunity. The truth
might appear to be the op~ite upon closer examination of the dictum of Chief JUstice Marshall in The
Schooner "Exchan~e" v. McFaddon and others
(1812)}46 Initially, Immunities of States were recognized only in respect of certain specified areas: (a) the
immunity of the sovereigns from arrest and detention;
(b) the immunity granted to foreign ministers; and (c)
the immunity in respect of foreign troops passing
through the territorial dominion. The territorial jurisdiction was exempted as a matter of implied consent on
the part of the local sovereign, and immunity was
accordingly considered to be an exception to the attributes of every sovereign power. As such, it should be
restrictively construed from the point of view of the
territorial sovereign. The same Chief Justice, in
another case decided in 1824, supported the soundness
of the principle "that when a government becomes a
partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far
as concerns the transactions of that company, of its
1410ste"eichische Juristen Zeilung ... , p. 347; and United
Nations, Materials . ..• p. 195.
l42See footnotes 144 and 145 below.
1430ecision of the Administrative Tribunal of 13 January 1954
(Amtliche Sammlung. No. 869; summary (in English) in Journal du
~roit in.ter1ltlti01Ul1 (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 83 (1956), p. 86), whereby
Immu~lIty was refused to a business undertaking owned in Austria by
a forel$n Government for making and selling alcohol in violation of
regulations concerning the State hard liquor monopoly.
1440ecision of the Austrian Supreme Court of 10 February 1961 in
X (Holubek) V. Government of the United States (Juristische Blatter
(Vl~:nna), vol. 84 (1962), p. 43; text reproduced in English trans. in
UDlted Nations. Materials on Jurisdicti01Ulilmmunities ... , pp. 203
et seq.) .

14~Extract o! a note 0(23 April

1928 addressed to the League of
by Swlt~erland, CI~d by the Court (Juristische Bliitter: : ., p.
44; UDlted Nations, Matenals ... , p. 205). See also the deCiSion of
the Austrian Supreme Court of 14 February 1963 in the case Xv. the
Nation~

Gove~~t of the Fednal Republic of Germany (Entscheidun$en des
Oste"elChtSchen Obenten Gerichtshofin Zivilsachen, 1963 (Vienna),

vol: XXX~, p. 71, II!0' 26; text reproduced in English trans.
UDlted Nations, Materials . ..• pp. 207-2(9).
146See footnote 58 above.
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soverei~ character, and takes that of a private
citizen' .147
75. The first emphatic pronouncement of restrictive
immunity based on the distinction between acts which
are essentially private in nature and acts which have
been generally characterized as public or ~overnmental
was made in 1921 by Judge Julian Mack l48 in a famous
case concerning the " Pesaro". This distinction was
supported by the State Department,l49 but was rejected
by the Supreme Court in 1926,150 revising Judge Mack's
decision and favouring the view expressed by the
Department of Justice. 151 The courts in later cases
preferred to follow the suftestion of the political
department of government. 1S It was not until the Tate
Letter of 1952 that the official policy of the State
Department was restated in general and in the clearest
language in favour of a restrictive theory of immunity
based upon a distinction between acta imperii and acta
gestionis, and denying immunity in respect of acta
gestionis.
76. Trading activities of a foreign State conducted by
a trading corporation with separate legal personality
have been denied sovereign Immunity. Trading corporations owned or controlled by a forei~ Government have been held amenable to the junsdiction of
United States courts regardless of the assertion by the
foreign Government that they have been performing
government functions,153 and indeed even Irrespective
of the court's holding that the foreign corporations
were performing essentially "public" duties as opposed
to ordinary commercial operations l54 that are included
in the category of activities for which the rule of
immunity is not applicable. In most cases, such cor-
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147 Bank of the United Stiltes v. PlDnters' Bank of Georgia (1824)
(Wheaton,op. cit., p. 907 (see footnote 64 above»; see also Stilte of
Georgia v. City of Chattllnooga, Tennessee (1924) (United States
Reports, vol. 264 (1924), pp. 472, at 482-483, opiruon of the Court
delivered by Justice Butler).
I48The "Pesaro" (1921) (United States of America, The Federal
Reporter, vol. 277 (1922), pp. 473, at 479-480, footnote 3); see also
E. D. Dickinson, "The immunity of public ships employed in trade",
The American Jou17Ull of InternationiU Law (Washington, D.C.), vol.
21 (January 1927), p. 108.
149Letter of 2 August 1921 from Mr. Nielsen, Solicitor for the
Department of State, to Judge Julian W. Mack (see G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Washington, D.C.), U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941, vol. II, pp. 438-439).
.
I50Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. "Pesaro" (1926) (United Stiltes
Reports, vol. 271 (1927), p. 562).
151 See, for example, the letter of Attorney General Gregory of 25
November 1918, refusing to adopt Secretary of State Lansing's
suggestion in his letter of 8 November 1918 (Hackworth, op. cit., vol.
II, p. 430).
1S2See Chief Justice Stone in Republic of Mexico et aI. v. Hoffman
(1945):
"It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our
government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new
~unds which the government has not seen fit to recognize."
(United Sillies Reports, vol. 324 (1946), p. 35.)
153 See , for example, Coale et aI. v. Societe cooperative suisse
des charbons, Basle et al. (1921) (Annual Digest . .. , 1919-1922
(London), vol. 1 (1932), case No. 88, p. 133); Dexter & Carpenter,
Inc. v. Kung.Jig Jamviigsstylrelsen et al. (1930) (Annual Digest . .. ,
1929-1930 (London), vol. 5 (1935), case No. 70, p. 109); United
Sillies v. DtulSches kaiisyndiJclll Gesellschaft et al. (1929) (ibid., case
No. 71, p. 110).
IS4See, for example, Hannes v. Kingdom of Romania Monopolies
Instilule (1940) (Annual Digest ... , 193frl940 (I:ondon), _vol. 9
(1942), case No. 72, pp. 198 et seq.); and CompanJa EspanolD de
Navegacwn, MarllimD, S.A. v. The "Navnnar" et aI. (1938) (United
Sillies Reports, vol. 303 (1938), p. 68).

porations not identified as agents, organs or instrumentalities of government have been engaged in
trading activities. Immunity has been refused, regardless of the extent of government interest in the trading
corporations. 155
n. An interesting trend was initiated in a more recent
case decided in 1964,156 where the Federal District
Court rejected immunity in an action arising out of a
contract for the carriage of wheat. According to this
trend, the courts are disposed to deny immunity unless
it is plain that the activity in question falls within one of
the following categories of strictly political and public
acts: (a) internal administrative acts, such as e~ulsion
of aliens; (b) legislative acts, such as nationalIzation;
(c) acts concernin$ the armed forces; (d) acts concerning diplomatic activity; (e) public loans.1~7
78. Since the adoption of the Foreign Immunities Act
of 1976,158 the courts have been left on their own
without specific guidance or suggestion of immunity in
a particular case from the State department. Pre-1976
judicial practice has thus been to a greater or lesser
extent influenced by the "views" or "suggestion" of the
executive branch of the government, especially if it is
one favourable to the granting of immunity.l59 Even
before the 1976 Act, the courts had to determine the
question of State immunity raised by the parties to the
dispute without any guidance or "suggestion" from the
executive. In such cases,l60 the courts have faithfully
followed the guidelines set out in the Tate Letter and
subsequent case-law.
79. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
provides legislative guidance for the courts with regard
to the application of the exception of commercial
activity carried on in the United States, or an act
performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity elsewhere, or an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity, causing a direct effect in the
United States. "Commercial activity" is defined as
either a regular course of conduct or a particular
155 See, for example, United Sillies v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat
Gesellschaft et aI. (1929)(see footnote 153 above); and Ulen de Co. v.
Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (1940) (Annual Digest . ... , 193fr
194() (op. cit.), case No. 74, p. 214).
156 Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisario General de Abastecimientos
y Transporlts (1964) (United States of America, Federal Reporter, 2nd
Series, vol. 336 (1965), p. 354; International Law Reports (London), vol.
35 (967), p. 110).
1S7Cf. the categories proposed by H. Lauterpacht, "The problem
of jurisdictional immunities of foreign States", The British Year Book
of International Law, 1951 (London), vol. 28, pp. 236-238; and J. F.
Lalive, "L'immunite de juridiction des Etats et des organisations
internationales", Recutil des cours ... , 1953-1lI (Leyden, Sijthoff,
1955), vol. 84, pp. 28~286).
158 United Sillies Code, 1976 Edition, vol. 8, title 28, sect. 97, p. 206
(text reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional
Immunities . . ., pp. 5S et seq.).
IS9ChemicaI Natural Resources v. Republic of VenezutlD (1966)
(/ntmlational Law Rtports (London), vol. 42 (1971), p. 119);
Isbrandtsen Tankers v. President of India (1970) (International Legal
Matoiols (Washington, D.C.), vol. X, No.5 (September 1971), p.
1(46); Amior Corporation v. Bank of Korea (1969) (Internatiotial
Law Reports (Cambridge), vol. 53 (1919), p. 291).
160 See , for example, Heaney v. Government of Spain and Gomero
(1971) (/nterruJlionai Legal Materials (Washin~on, D.C.), vol. X,
No.5 (September 1971), p. 1038), where publicity was held to be a
"strictly political or public act" (p. 1042); Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba (1976) (ibid., vol. XV, No.4 (July 1976), p.
735). where four Justices of the United States Supreme Court noted:
"In their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not exercise
powers peculiar to sovereigns." (pp. 7~747).

commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity is determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or {'articular transaction, rather than by reference to Its purpose. Subsequent litigations amply illustrate the difficulties
inherent in the application of this exception of "trading
activity", especially in borderline cases. 161

United Kingdom
SO. In view of the recent reversal of a long line of
cases allowing State immunity even in res{>Cct of trading activity of a foreign Government, it IS no longer
fashionable to state that British courts have consistently
upheld jurisdictional immunity in any circumstance. In
actual fact, British practice can now be said to have
adopted a restrictive theory of immunity, particularly in
respect of "commercial transactions" and "contracts to
be performed in the United Kin~dom" or "an industrial, commercial or financial activity". In connection
with commercial activities of foreign States, notably in
the field of shipping or maritime transport, the case-law
fluctuated throughout the nineteenth century .162 The
decision that went furthest in the direction of restriction
was The "Charkieh" (1873),163 and in the opposite
direction was The "Porto Alexandre" (1920).1 64 The
principle of unqualified immunity was applied in subsequent cases in respect of commercial shippin~ in 1924165
and other trading activities, such as the ordmary commercial sale of a quantity of rye in 1957. 166
81. Long before the final coup de grace given by the
House of Lords in the "/ Congreso del Partido" case
(1981),167 judicial decisions of British courts abounded
with opinions and dicta pronounced by members of the
courts at all levels. Even in the House of Lords in The
"Cristina" case (1938),168 considerable doubts were
161 See, for example, IntenuuiofUll Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (1979) (United States of America, Federal Supplement,
vol. 477 (1979), p. 553; reproduced in United Nations, Materials on
JurisdictiofUlllmmunities . .. , pp. 503 et seq.); and cases compiled by
the State Department: Libyan American Oil Company v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahirira (1980) (see footnote 28 above),
utelier v. Republic of Chile (1980) (United States of America,
Federal Supplement, vol. 488 (1980), p. 665), New England Merchants NatiofUll Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission
Co. et al. (1980) (ibid., vol. 495 (1981), p. 73).
162See Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities . ..
(op. cit., footnote 105 above), pp. 53-71.
163See footnote 59 above; compare Sir Robert Phillimore's judgment in The "Parlement beige" case (1879) (see footnote 60 above).
164United Kingdom, The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1920, p.

30.
165Compania Mercantil Argentina v. United States Shipping Board
(1924) (Annual Digest . .. , 1923-1924 (London), vol. 2 (1933), case
No. 73, p. 138).
.166Baccus S. R. L. v. Servicio Nacional del Trigo (1956) (United
Kingdom, The Law Reports, Queen's Bench Division, 1957, vol. 1,
p.438).
~67 The All England Law Reports, 1981, vol. 2, p. 1064 (Lord
~I1berforce, Lord Diplock, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Keith of
Kinkel, Lord Bridge of Harwich); see also the decision of the Court
of Appeal in 1980 (Lord Denning and Lord Waller) (ibid., vol. I,
p. 1092).
.
168United Kingdom, The Law Reports, House of Lords, Judicial
Comminee of the Privy Council, 1938, p. 485; Annual Digest . ..
1938-1940 (London), vol. 9 (1942) case No. 86, p. 250. See H.
Lauterpacht, "The CristifUl", The Law Quarterly Review (London),
vol. LIV (1938), p. 339: F. A. Mann, "Immunity of foreign States",
The !oIodem Law Review (London), vol. II (1938), p. 57; R. Y.
Jenrungs, "Recognition and government immunities", ibid., vol. II
(1939), p. 288.

thrown upon the soundness of the doctrine of immunity
when ap{'lied to trading vessels. While Lord Atkin and
Lord Wnght l69 favoured an unrestricted rule of immunity, Lord Thankerton l70 and Lord.Maugham declared
themselves free to reconsider the decision in The
"Porto Alexandre". Lord Mau~am was prepared to
subject The "Cristina" to the Jurisdiction of English
courts, had she been a vessel employed by the Spanish
Government in commercial voyages, and stated that "if
The Parlement Beige had been used solely for trading
pu~ses, the decision would have been the other way
. _ . '. Lord Maugham concluded that there was practical unanimity of opinion "that, if Governments or
corporations formed by them choose to navigate or
trade as shipowners, they ought to submit to the same
legal remedies and actions as any ship owner". 171
82. Lord Maugham's misgivings about the decisions
of The "Porto Alexandre" case (1920) have been widely
quoted and followed in common-law countries outside
the United Kingdom.172 In Dollfus Mieg et Cie S.A. v.
Bank of England (1950),173 Sir Raymond Evershed M. R.
agreed with Lord Maugham that "extent of the rule of
immunity should be jealously watched" .174 On further
appeal to the House of Lords in 1952, three out of four
Law Lords concurred in the observation of Lord
Maugham that the doctrine of immunity should not be
extended. 17S Viscount Simon is another exponent of a
restrictive theory of immunity. In Sultan of lohore v.
Abubakar, Tunku Aris Bendahara and others (1952),
Lord Simon in the Privy Council gave an opinion per
curiam denying "that there has been finally established
in England . . _ any absolute rule that a foreign independent sovereign cannot be impleaded in our courts in
any circumstances" .176 Another proponent of restrictive immunity is Lord Denning, who after a search
among the accepted sources of international law concluded that there was no uniform rule in Rahimtoola v.
Nizam of Hyderabad (1957),177 where he observed:
... If the dispute brings into question, for instance, the legislative
or international transactions of a foreign government, or the policy of
its executive, the court should grant immunity if asked to do so,
because it does offend the dignity of a foreign sovereign to have such
a dispute canvassed in the domestic court of another country but if
the dispute concerns, for instance, the commercial transactions of the
foreign Government (whether carried on by its own departments or
agencies or by setting up separate legal entities), and it arises
properly within the territorial ~urisdiction of our courts, there is DO
ground for granting immunity. 78
169United Kingdom, The Law Reports, House of Lords . .. , 1938,
pp. 490 and 512, respectively.
170 Ibid., pp. 494-496; see also the opinion of Lord Macmillan,
p.498.
171 Ibid., pp. 519 and 522.
172See, for example, The "Ramava" (1941) (Annual Digest . .. ,
1941-1942 (London), vol. 10 (1945), case No. 20, p. 91). In this Irish
case, immunity was denied, Justice Hanna having thought that the
decision of Sir Robert Phillimore in The "Charkieh" (1873) (see
footnote 59 above) was never overruled.
173 United Kingdom, The Law Reports, Chancery Division, 1950, p.
333.
174 Ibid. , p. 356.
175 United States of America and Republic of France v. Dol/Jus Mieg
et Cie S.A. and Bank of England (1952) (The All England Law
Reports, 1952, vol. 1, p. 572).
J76Ibid., p. 1261, opinion of the Council at p. 1268; see also The
Law Quarterly Review (London), vol. 68 (1952), p. 293.
177United Kingdom, The Law Reports, Housl! of Lords, 1958, p.
379.
178lbid., p. 422.

221

83.

Lord Denning reiterated his restrictive theory in
Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd. v. Government of
Pakistan, Ministry of Food and A~riculture, Directorate
of Agricultural Supplies (1975).179 Apart from consent,
he outlined four exceptions:
First, (there is] no immunity in respect of land situate in England.
Second . . . in respect of trust funds here or money lodged for the
payment of creditors. '.' .
Third . . . in respect of debts incurred here for services rendered to
... property here ....
Fourth, (when] a foreign sovereign ... enters into a commercial
transaction- with a trader here and a dispute arises which is
properly within the territorial jurisdiction of (English] courts. 1M!

84. Lord Denning's dicta and observations have been
very well received outside the United Kingdom.un
Finally, a forerunner of the ultimate reversal came with
the decision of the Privy Council in the "Philippine
Admirar' case in 1975. 182 The Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council, for the first time, refused to follow
the Court of Appeal in The "Porto Alexandre" case,
and gave the following weighty reasons:
... In the first place, the Court decided the case as it did because
its members thought they were bound to so decide by The Parlement
Beige, whereas-as their Lordships think-the decision in The Parlement Beige did not cover the case at all. Secondly, although Lord
Atkin and Lord Wright approved the decision in The Porto Alexandre, the other three Law Lords who took part in The Cristina case
thought it was at least doubtful whether sovereign immunity should
extend to state-owned vessels engaged in ordinary commerce.
Moreover this Board in the case of The Sultan of lohore made it clear
that it considered that the question was an open one. Thirdly, the
trend of opinion in the world outside the Commonwealth since the
last war has been increasingly against the application of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity to ordinary trading transactions. Lastly, their
Lordships themselves think that it is wrong that they should be so
applied. 183

85. In 1977, the Court of Appeal in Trendtex Trading
Corporation Ltd. v. The Central Bank of Nigeria 184 held
unanimously that the Central Bank was a separate
entity and, by a majority of two to one, that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity no longer applied to
ordinary trading transactions and that the restrictive
doctrine should be applied to actions in personam as
well as actions in rem. ISS This emeq~ing trend away
from unlimited immunity culminated 10 the long-over179 The AU England Low Reports, 1975, vol. 3, p. 961.
1M!lbid., pp. 965-966. See also the Supreme Court of Ontario in
Harold W. M. Smith v. United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (1976) (International Legal Materials (Washington,
D.C.), vol. XV, No.2 (March 1976), p. 319 and particularly pp.
323-j24).
181See , for example, the opinion of Justice Owen in the Court of
Appeal of Quebec in Venne v. Democratic Republic of the Congo
(1969) (Canada, The Dominion Low Reports, Third Series (Toronto),
vol. 5 (1969), p. 128): an action to recover fees for services provided
in designing a pavilion at Exp0-67 was allowed to proceed.
1820wners of the ship "Philippine Admiraf' v. Wallem Shipping
(Hong Kong), Ltd. (1975) (The All England Low Reports, 1976, vol.
1, p. 78).
183lbid., p. 95.
IB4See footnote 55 above. The Trendtcx case was settled before it
reached the House of Lords, so that many issues remained unresolved. The case Uganda Co. (Holdings) Ltd. v. Government of
Uganda (1978) (Uoyd's Low Reports, 1979 (London), vol. 1, p. 481)
illustrates one such unsatisfactory result.
111SSee the difference between the incorporation theory and the
transfomtation theory of intemationallaw as part of English law. See
also A. O. Adede, "The United Kingdom abandons the doctrine of
absolute sovereign immunity", Brooklyn Journal of International
Low, vol. VI, No.2 (1980), p. 197.

due decision of the House of Lords in the" I Congreso
del Partido" (l981)}86 Apart from the interesting
peculiarities and niceties of English Admiralty rules ana
procedures such as sister ship jurisdiction, which will be
examined in a separate connection,l87 this decision of
the House of Lords put an end to some of the doubts
and hesitations on matters of principle. Reinforced by
the State Immunity Act 1978,188 the judicial practice of
British courts must now be said to be well settled in
relation to the exception of trading activities of foreign
Governments.
86. Althou~ the law or judicial practice may have
been settled 10 principle with regard to the exception of
trading activity, the courts are still confronted in each
case with the task of determinin$ whether the element
of governmental authority exerCIsed in relation to the
set of facts involved is such as to render the activity in
question governmental and non-commercial. The
courts still have to decide in a particular case whether in
the application of the restnctive rule to follow an
objective test of the "nature of the transaction" or the
more subjective test of "public purpose" or the combination of both, or indeed the more formal test of
"legislative intervention" by the foreign Government.
87. The dramatic change in the judicial practice of the
United Kingdom as a principal common-law system is
apt to produce changes in other common-law jurisdictions, especially within the Commonwealth of Nations.
Such changes may take time to materialize. In
Australia l89 and New Zealand, the repercussions of the
English decision in the "I Congreso del Partido" case
will be felt. Recently the Canadian case-Iawl90 has
tended to follow the examples set by the United
Kingdom and the United States191 by adopting
appropriate legislation to assist the courts to ensure a
practice that will be more harmonious and consistent
with the current trend. l92 Likewise, recent developments in the case-law of India deserve a close
examination. 193

Pakistan
88. Pakistan and India share a similar Code of Civil
Procedure-section 86, paragraph 1 of which provides
that:
186See footnote 167 above; see the judgment pronounced by Lord
Wilberforce (loc. cit., pp. lO6(r.l078), Lord Edmund-Davies concurring in favour of dismissing the appeal in the "Marble Islands" case
(pp. 1~1082), and dissenting opinions of Lord Diplock (pp.
1078-1080), on the one hand, and of Lord Keith and Lord Bridge
(pp. 1082-1083), on the other, both in favour of allowing the appeal.
187Immunities of public vessels or State-owned ships employed in
commerce will be considered under a separate heading.
188United Kingdom, The Public General Acts, 1978, part 1, chap.
33, p. 715 (reproduced in United Nations, Materials on lurisdictit?nal
Immunities Of States . .. , pp. 41 et seq.); see the reply ofthe Umted
Kingdom to question 3 of the questionnaire sent to Governments in
1979 (United Nations, Materials . .. , pp. 621-622). See also F. A.
Mann, "The State Immunity Act 1978", The British Year Book of
International Low, 1978 (London), vol. 49, p. 43.
189 See , for example, Sinclair, loco cit., pp. 190-192 (see footnote
116 above).
.
190 Ibid., pp. 192-193.
191 See the United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978 (see footnote
188 above) and the United States of America Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (see footnote 158 above).
I92See footnote 221 below.
I93 See , for example. Sinclair, loco cit., pp. 194-195.

No rulers of a foreign State may be sued in 1liiy court otherwise
competent to try the suit except with the consent of the Central
Government in writing by a Secretary to that Government. l94

The courts in Pakistan, like those in India 19S had
occasions to consider the relationship betw~n this
provision and general international law. In 1971 the
Court of Karachi was not inclined to follow the ru1~s of
interpretation adopted by En2lish courts, but rather to
have recourse to prevalent religious and spiritual standards in interpre~in.g and enforcing laws. l96 It was
regarded as penmssible and not uncommon, even in
secular Stat<:s, to !ill the gaps .in international law by
normal considerations and taking recourse to Islamic
law.
89. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in a breathtaking decision in A. M. Qureshi v. Union of Soviet
Socia/~t Republics and another (1981),197 took occasion
!o ~e~e~ and survey the laws and practice of other
Junsdlctlons as well as relevant international conventions and opir~i~ns .of writers, and confirming with
approval the dlstmchon between acta jure imperii and
acta jure gestionis, held that the courts of Pakistan had
jurisdiction in respect of commercial acts of a foreign
Government. It was observed in conclusion by Justice
Kar~m Elahee Chauhan (with four other judges concumng):
The upshot, in my view, of this discussion is that:
(1) Section 86 of the Civil Procedure Code does not bar the suit
filed by .tie appellant against the respondents;
(~) That there is no positive rule of Customary International [law)
which.can be pleaded as a bar of jurisdiction to the maintainability of
the SUIt. On the other hand, the rule of International Law followed by
most States at present and which rule, in my view, should be followed
by the Courts of Pakistan is that acts of a commercial nature are not
immune from the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts. Therefore,
the plaintiff's suit was maintainable and the decision to dismiss it as
incompetent is erroneous and deserves to be set aside. l98

Argentina
90. An examination of the case-law of Argentina
reveals a trend in favour of a restrictive doctrine of
State immunity. The courts recognized and applied the
principle of sovereign immunity in various cases with
regard to sovereign acts of a foreign Government. l99
The exception of trading activity was confirmed in The

1941ndia, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, The Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as modified up to 1 May 1977), p. 32;
Pakistan, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, The Pakistan
Code (Karachi), vol. V (190S-1910), p. 53.
I9SSe e , for example, Kashani v. United Arab Republic (1965) (The
Indian Journal of International Law (New Delhi), vol. 6 (1966), p. 51;
The American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.t.), vol.
60 (1966), p. 861); see also Sinclair, loc. cit., p. 194.
196 The Secretary of State of the United States of America V. Messrs.
Gammon-Layton (1971) (All Pakistan Legal Decisions (Lahore), vol.
XXIII (1971), p. 314).
197 Ibid. , vol. XXXIII (1981), p. 377.
• 198 Ibid. , p. 453.
199 See , for example, Baima y Bessolina V. Gobiemo del Paraguay
(l91~) (Argentina,. Fa/los de ID Corte Suprema de Justicia de ID
Nadon (Buenos AIres), vol. 123, p. 58); United Stales Shipping
·Board V. Dodero Hermanos (1924) (ibid., vol. 141, p. 127)' IIIId
Zubiau"e v: Gobierno de Bolivia (1899) (ibid., vol. 79, p. 124)'; also
~ocl!mentatl0!l submitt~d by Argentina concerning its national legIslation (English trans. ID United Nations, MaterialS on Jurisdictional
Immunities . .. , pp. 3-4) and the decisions of national courts (ibid.,

pp.

7~74).

UAguila''1OO in respect of a contract of sale to be
performed and complied with within the jurisdictional
limits of the Argentine Republic. The court declared
itself competent and ordered the case to proceed on the
grounds "that the intrinsic validity of thiS contract and
aU matters relating to it should be regulated in accordance with the general laws of the Nation and that the
national courts are competent in such matters" .:2111
Chile
91. The case-law of Chile appears to have firmly
recognized the princi{>le of sovereign immunity without
drawing any distinction between the various acts or
activities of a foreign State. Recent decisions have
confirmed a uniform doctrine on broad and practically
unrestricted recognition of the jurisdictional immunities of foreign States. 2m The Supreme Court of Justice
in 1975 annulled the final judgment of 16 January 1969
rendered by the Fifth Santiago Superior Departmental
Court in A. Senerman v. Republic of Cuba, on the
~ound that ". . . in regulating the junsdictional activ!ty of different Stat~s the .limit im~sed on this activity,
m regard to the subjects, IS that which determines that a
sovereign State must not be subject to the jurisdictional
power of the courts of another State".203 There has
been no decision directly on the J?Ossibility of an
exception in respect of trading activities.
Philippines
92. The Supreme Court of the Philippines has had
several occasions to consider and give judgments on
various general aspects of State immunitles. However,
the question directly in point, namely the possible
exception of tradin~ctivity, has not yet come before
the Supreme Court.

(b) Governmental practice
93. An examination of the governmental practice of
States in regard to the application of State Immunities
~d ~ading activities should cover several aspects,
mcludmg the role played by the executive in influencing
judicial decisions, and the views of the Governments on
the su~je~ and n?t only i~ connection with a plea of
sovereign Immumty submitted by a foreign Government, but also the extent to which a State is prepared to
forego the privilege of sovereign immunity and to
21XJ M~istro Plenipotenciario de Chile V. Fratelli Lavarello (1892)
(ArgentlDa, Fa/los de ID Corte Suprema de Justicia de fa Nadon
(Buenos Aires), vol. 47, p. 248).
201 Extract of the decision in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , p. 73; see also I. Ruiz Moreno, EI Derecho
Internadonal Publico ante la Corte Suprema (Editorial Universitaria
de Buenos Aires, 1941).
~Three of the four cases cited in the documentation submitted by
Chtle (United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . .. ,
pp. ~251) concerned the years 1968 and 1969 and, respectively, a
labour dispute and preventive injunctions.
203This decision of the Supreme Coun of 2 June 1975 is more
di~ectly in point; it establishes a doctrine of sovereifn immunity
WIthout delimiting its scope of application (ibid., p. 25 ). Similarly,
~raziI's reply to question 3 of the questionnaire sent to Governments
m 1979 states that "Brazilian couns consider the doctrine of immunity of States as absolute" (ibid., p. 562) but does not give any
reference to a specific decision.
204Se e an interesting survey of decisions of the Philippines Supreme Coun (ibid., pp. 360 et seq.).

conclude such agreements in the form of bilateral or
multilateral treaties.
(i) The role of the executive
94. Within a given jurisdiction, the political branch of
the Government or the executive as represented by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Justice
could have a part to play in the determination of
questions of junsdictional immunities of foreign States.
The practice is well-known, for instance, in the United
States, of "views" or "suggestions" given to the trial
courts in particular instances. Whether or not and to
what extent the "views" or "suggestions" of the executive will be followed in each case depends ultimately on
the court itself. In the United States, the "Tate Letter"
of 1952205 may be considered a classic example of a
general policy or guidelines given by the Government
for the jUdiciary. After reviewing comparative caselaw, the "Tate Letter" clearly indicated the intention of
the Government "to follow the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of
foreign ~overnments for a grant of sovereign
immunity' .206
95. Quite apart from the declaration of a policy or
guidelines in general such as the "Tate Letter" and
specific "views" or "suggestions of immunity" given in
particular cases, the executive· could bring about
changes in legal decisions by introducing new rules in
the form of legislation. As will be seen, this has been
done in the United States of America in 1976, the
United Kingdom in 1978, Pakistan in 1981, and is being
done in Canada, and contemplated in Singapore and
Barbados.

(ii) Views of Governments
96. The views of Governments on the topic can be
deduced from the prevailing internal laws on the subject. In the absence of specific legislation, they could be
expressed either in a particular case or as a general
policy and guidelines as in the Tate Letter. The governmental practice as evidenced by the views of the
executive can be found sometimes in the form of
advices and legal opinions, such as is the practice in the
United Kingdom,207 the Federal Republic of
205Letter of 19 May 1952 to Acting Attorney General Perlman
from the Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State. J. B. Tate
(United States of America. The Department of State Bulletin
(Washington. D.C.). vol. XXVI. No. 678 (23 June 1952). pp.
984-985). See also W. W. Bishop. Jr.. "New United States policy
limiting sovereign immunity". The American Journal of Internlllional
Law (Washington. D.C.). vol. 47 (1953). p. 93; and L. M. Draschler.
"Some observations on the current status of the Tate Letter". ibid .•
vol. 54 (1960). p. 790.
lIIf'See Sinclair. loco cit .• pp. 161-162; Sucharitkul. Recueil des
coun . .. , 1976-1, pp. 158--161 (see footnote 38 above. in fine). See
the cases Uniled States of Mexico et al. v. Schmuck ~ al. (1943)
(Annual Digest . .. , 1943-1945 (London), vol. 12 (1949). case No.
21, p. 75); Ex parte R~UbliC of Peru (1943) (United States Reports.
vol. 318 (1943). p. 578 ; The "Katingo Hadjipalera" (1941) (United
States of America. Fe ral Supplement. vol. 40 (1942). pp. 546-548;
on appeal. Federal Reporter. Second Series. vol. 119 (1941). p. 1022;
certoriori denied. United States Reports. vol. 313 (1941). p. 593);
Republic of Mexico etal. V. Hoffman (1945) (see footnote 152 above);
The "Martin Behrman" (1947) (Annual Digest . .. , 1947. vol. 14
(1951), case No. 26. p. 75); and Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisario
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes (1964) (see footnote 156
above).
317 See. for example, Lord McNair. Internlllional lAw Opinions
(Cambridge University Press. 1956). vol. I. p. 71.

Germany208 and other countries. Source materials are
not readily available except in the official files of the
ministries of foreign affairs or of justice or the Attorney
General's office. They are to be found also in the
materials submitted by Member Governments as well
as in replies to the questionnaire on specific questions.
For instance, the Governments of Czechoslovakia,209
the German Democratic Republic210 and Poland2l1
have expressed their views favouring an unrestricted
theory of immunity in preference to a distinction being
made between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis,
which is not always workable.
97. While the views of Governments on a particular
question of international law clearly have a bearing on
legal developments, they do not as such afford evidence
of customary rules of international law, save to the
extent that they have been incorporated in judicial
decisions or legislation, or indeed, treaty provisions.
None the less, tbe wishes of Governments are material
and should be taken into consideration. They are
certainly relevant in relation to the possibility of implied waiver or implied consent, and could be conditioned by differing results due to the application of
the principle of reciprocity. Reciprocity appears to
operate to limit or restrict immunity, rather than
extend its application, in the wake of increasing tendencies to deny State immunity in several identified areas
of activities such as trading.
(iii) Treaty practice
98. The attitude or views of a Government can be
gathered from its established treaty practice. Bilateral
treaties may contain provisions whereby parties agree
in advjlnce to submit to the jurisdiction of the local
courts in respect of certain specified areas of activities
such as trading. Thus, the treaty practice of the Soviet
Union amply demonstrates its willingness to have the
commercial relations carried on by separate enterprises
or trading organizations regulated by competent territorial authorities. 212 While the fact that a State is
consistent in its practice in this particular regard may be
considered as proof of the absence of rules of international law on the subject, or the permissiveness
of deviation or derogation from such rules through
bilateral agreements, an accumulation of such bilateral
treaty practices could combine to corroborate the evidence of existence of a general practice of States in
support of the limitations agreed upon, which could
ripen into accepted exceptions in international practice.
This view was substantiated by a member of the

-See, for example, the note of 24 August 1964 addressed to the
in the Fede~al Republic of Germany by the
Acting Legal Counsel of the ColombIan GOvernment. Mr. H. Ruiz
Varela (English trans. in United Nations. Materials on Jurisdictional
Immunities . ..• I'P. 79 et seq.); and the note of 7 August 1979 to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations from the Charge d'affaires
of the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany (see
footnote 128 above).
.
2119United Nations. Materiols Oil Jurisdictional Immunities ...• pp.
82-83.
210 Ibid. , pp. 84-85.
211lbid .• pp. 90-91.
12
2 See footnote 214 below for a list of treaties between socialist
countries containing provisions on jurisdictional immunities of
States.
Am~assador of Colombia

Commission regarding the practice of his own
country. 213
99. An example typical of the provisions contained in
a series of treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with
socialist countries is furnished by the Treaty of Trade
and Navigation with the People's Republic of China,
signed at Peking on 23 April 1958. 214 With regard to the
legal status of the Trade Delegation of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics in China and the Chinese
Trade Delegation in the Soviet Union, article 4 of the
annex provides:
The Trade Delegation shall enjoy all the immunities to which a
sovereign State is entitled and which relate also to foreign trade, with
the following exceptions only, to which the Parties agree:
(a) Disputes regarding foreign commercilll contracts· concluded or
guaranteed under article 3 by the Trade Delegation in the territory of
the receiving State shall, in the absence of a reservation regarding
arbitration or any other jurisdiction, be subject to the competence of
the courts of the said State. No interim court orders for the provision
of security may be made;
(b) Final judicial decisions against the Trade Delegation in the
aforementioned disputes which have become legally valid may be
enforced by execution, but such execution may be levied only on the
goods and claims outstanding to the credit of the Trade Delegation.

100. A comparable provision of article 10 of the
Agreement with France of 1951,215 typical of treaties
concluded between the Soviet Union and developed
countries, reads:
The Trade Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
in France shall enjoy the privileges and immunities arising out of
article 6 above, with the following exceptions:
Disputes regarding commercilll transactions· concluded or guaranteed in the territory of France by the Trade Delegation of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics under the first paragraph of article 8 of
this Agreement shall, in the absence of a reservation regarding
arbitration or any other jurisdiction, be subject to the competence of
the French courts and be settled in accordance with French raw, save
as otherwise provided by the terms of individual contracts or by
French legislation.
No interim orders may, however, be made against the Trade
Delegation.

101.

Another set of treaties concluded by the Soviet

21lSee the statement by Mr. Tsuruoka during the thirty-third
session of the Commission in which he referred to the trade treaties
concluded by Japan with the United States in 1953 and with the
USSR in 1957 (Yearbook . .. 1981, vol. I, p. 63, 1654th meeting,
para. 23).
21'United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 313, p. 135. Cf. treaties
signed by the USSR with Romania (1947) (ibid., vol. 226, p. 79);
Hungary (1947) (ibid., vol. 216, p. 247); Czechoslovakia (1947)
(ibid., vol. 217, p. 35); Bulgaria (1948) (ibid., p. 97); the German
Democratic Republic (1957) (ibid., vol. 292, p. 75); Mongolia (1957)
(ibid., vol. 687, p. 237); Albania (1958) (ibid., vol. 313, P: 261); Vi~t
Nam (1958) (ibid., vol. 356,]. 149); the Democratlc People. s
Republic of Korea (1960) (ib· ., vol. 399, p. 3); ~~echoslovakla
(1973) (ibid., vol. 904, p. 17). The relevant provlSlons of these
treaties are reproduced in English in United Nations, Materials on
Jurisdictional Immunities ... , pp. 134-139.
215 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 221, p. 95. See, for example,
the case Societe Ie Gostorg et Representation commerciale de /,URSS
v. Association France-Export (1926) (see footnote 106 above). Cf.
similar provisions in treaties concluded by the USSR with Denmark
1946) (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 8, p. 201); Finland (1947)
ibid., vol. 217, p. 3 ; Italy (1948 (ibid., p. 181); Austria (1955)
{ibid., vol. 240, p.
Japan
(ibid., vol. 325, p. 35); Federal
Republic of Germany (1958) (ibid., vol. 346, p. 71); the Netherlands
(1971) (Traclalenblad van hetKoninkrijk der Nederlanden (The
Hague, 1971), No. 163). The relevant proviSions of these treaties are
reproduced in English in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional
Immunities . .. , pp. 140-144.

2iJ);

(l95~)

Union with developing countries also contain provisions recognizing the exception of commercial transactions. Thus, paragraph 3 of the exchange of letters of 2
December 1953 concerning the Trade Agreement between the Soviet Union and India216 reads:
It was agreed that the commercial transactions entered into or
guaranteed in India by the members of the Trade Representations
including those stationed in New Delhi shall be subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of India and the laws thereof unless
otherwise provided by agreement between the contracting parties to
the said transactions. Only the goods, debt demands and other assets
of the Trade Representation directly relating to the commercial
transactions concluded or guaranteed by the Trade Representation
IbaI1 be liable in execution of decrees and orders passed in respect of
such transactions. It was understood that the Trade Representation
will not be responsible for any transactions concluded by other Soviet
organizations direct, without the Trade Representation's guarantee.

102. This limitation on State immunity in respect of
commercial transactions is consistently maintamed in
practically all treaties and agreements concluded not
only by the Soviet Union but also by a host of nonSOCIalist countries. The conglomeration of such treaty
provisions appears to suggest a clear evidence of
emerging State practice in favour of the practicality of
the exception of trading as a restrictIon on State
immunity. The emerging rules of customary international law seem to have been crystallized in the direction of such an exception. This trend is further countenanced by international efforts towards codification of
the subject under examination, some of which have
already born fruit in the form of multilateral or regional
conventions (see paras. 108-116 below).
(iv) Nationa//egislation
103. The question of jurisdiction of the courts of a
particular country is provided for in a number of
different t~s of legIslation, statutes, basic law or
constitutions. 217 Of greater relevancy to the current
study is a special type of specific legislation, laws
and decrees (lealing with jurisdictional immunities of
foreign States in particular. It is of the greatest interest
to note that recent legislation of this category invariably
contains a provision with regard to the exception of
trading activity or commercial transaction. Thus, sections 1604 and 1605 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 of the United States218 provide:
Section 1604. Immunity of a foreign state
from jurisdiction
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United

216United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 240, p. 157. See the corresponding provisions in treaties concluded by the USSR with other
developinj cc:'u.ntries, such as Egypt (1956) (ibid., y~1. 687, p. 221);
Ira9 (195H) (IbId., vol. 328, p. 118); Togo (1961) (IbId., vol. 730, p.
187); Ghana (1961) (ibid., vol. 655, p. 171); Yemen (1963) (ibid.,
vol. 672, p. 315); Brazil (1963) (ibid., vol. 646, p. 277); Singapore
(1966) (ibid., vol. 631, p. 125); Costa Rica (1970) (ibid., vol. 957, p.
347); Bolivia (1970) (ibid., p. 373). The relevant provisions of these
treaties are reproduced in English in United Nations, Materials on
Jurisdictionallmmunities . .. , pp. 145-150.
217Se e , for example, Legislative Decree No. 189 of 1 April 1952 of
the Syrian Arab Republic (A/CN.4/343/ Add.l, pp. 1-3); and
excerpts from relevant laws of Yugoslavia rerroduced in English in
United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictiona Immunities ... , pp.
69-70.
21SSee footnote 158 above. See also United States of America,
Department of the Treasu£¥, Internal Revenue Service, "Income of
foreign governments: NotIce of proposed rulemaking" (Federal
Register, vol. 43, No. 158 (15 Au~ust 1978), pp. 36111-36114);
reproduced in United Nations, Matenals on Jurisdictional Immunities
. .. , pp. 63 et seq.

States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of
this chapter.

Section 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional
immunity of G foreign stGte
(G) A foreign state shall DOt be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case:

(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed
in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States;

104. Without commenting in detail on the above
provision, which also delineates the questions of jurisdiction that could be exercised by the courts of the
United States or of the states, it is interesting to
compare the provisions of similar legislation in other
countries. The State Immunity Act 1978 of the United
Kingdom219 contains the following provisions:
Exceptions from immunity
3. (1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to:
(G) a commercial transaction entered into by the State; or
(b) an obligation of the State which by virtue of a contract
(whether a commercial transaction or not) falls to be performed wholly or partly in the United Kingdom.

Pakistan also issued an ordinance, No. VI of
1981, entitled the State Immunity Ordinance, 1981 220
which, like the United Kingdom State Immunity Act
1978, contains several exceptions from immunity, one
of which is "Commercial transactions and contracts to
be performed in Pakistan". The relevant provision
reads:

105.

5.

(1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to:
(G) a commercial transaction entered into by the State; or
(b) an obligation of the State which by virtue of a contract, which
mayor may not be a commercial transaction, falls to be
performed wholly or partly in Pakistan.

106. The expression "commercial transaction" is defined in subsection (3) as meaning:
(G) any contract for the supply of goods or services;
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and
any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such transaction
or of any other financial obligation; and
(c) any other transaction or activity, whether of a commercial,
industrial, financial, professional or other similar character,
into which a State enters or in which it engages otherwise than
in the exercise of its sovereign authority.

219See footnote 188 above. See also the Stille Immunity (Overseas
Territories) Order 1979 (United Kingdom, StGtutory Instruments
1979, part 1, p. 1130, No. 458; reproduced in United Nations,
MGleriGls on Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , pp. 53 et seq.), which
gives added precision to the meaning of "territory" in connection
with the contractual obligation to be performed by the State.
rNlThe GGzette of Pakistan (Islamabad), 11 March 1981 (text
reproduced in United Nations, MateriGls on JurisdictioMllmmunilies
. . . , pp. 20 et seq.).

It should be noted that similar legislation has
recently been adopted by the Canadian Parliament221
and Singapore222 and is being contemplated in
Barbadosw and St. Kitts.224 Similarly, the States which
have ratified the European Convention on State Immunity 1972 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus and United
Kingdom) have adopted internal legislation or made
necessary declarations to give effect to the provisions of
the Convention.22S

107.

3.

INTER.NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND EFFOR.TS
TOWARDS CODIFICATION

108. Under this heading, a brief survey will be made
of efforts towards international codification of the topic
or allied subject by private non-governmental circles
as well as by governmental bodies. Recent efforts culminating in international conventions deserve an early
mention.
(a) The European Convention on
State Immunity (1972)226
109. The European Convention on State Immunity,
1972 came into force on 11 June 1976 following ratifications by Austria, Belgium and Cyprus. The United
Kingdom is the fourth signatory to ratify. Article 7 of
the Convention provides:
1. A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another Contracting State if it has on the territory of
the State of the forum an office, agency or other establishment
through which it engages, in the same manner as a private person, in
an industrial, commercial or financial activity, and the proceedings
relate to that activity of the office, agency or establishment.
2. Paragraph 1 shaU not apply if all the parties to the dispute are
States, or if the parties have otherwise agreed in writing.

(b) The International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of Stateowned Vessels (Brussels, 1926)227
110. The Brussels Convention of 1926, as Gilbert
Gidel, the Rapporteur, puts it, "avait pour raison
22ISee Canada, An Act to provide for State immunity in Canadian
courts (StGte Immunity Act), entry into force 15 July 1982 (The
CatuuJa GGzette, PGrt 11I (Ottawa), vol. 6, No. 15 (22 June 1982),
p. 2949, chap. 95); section 5 of the Act provides:
"A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction ot a court In
any proceedings that relate to any commercial activity of the
foreign state."
222StGte Immunity Act 1979 (26 October 1979), reproduced in
United Nations, MGleriills on JurisdictioMllmmunities . .. , pp. 28 et

seq.
223See the information communicated to the Secretariat by the
Government of Barbados, ibid., pp. 74-75.
~See Sinclair, loco cit., p. 266.
22SSee, for example, the declarations of Austria (reproduced in
English in United Nations, MGleriills on JurisdictioMI Immunities
. .. ,pp.~).
216 Council of Europe, Ewopeon Convention on S/(lJ1! Immunity
Gnd AdditioMI Protocol, European Treaty Series, No. 74 (Strasbourg, 1972); and Expltuuuory Reports on the EuropeGn Convention
on StGle Immunity IlIId the AddilioMI Protocol (Strasbourg, 1972).
See also M. O. Wiederkehr, "La Convention euro¢enne sur
I'immunite des Etats", AnnUGire (r~Gis de droit inter1llltioMl, 1974,
vol. XX, Po' 925; I. M. Sinclair, "'The European Convention on State
immunity' , The Inter1llltional ond CompGrGtive Low Quarterly
(London), vol. 22 (1973), pp. 254.
227League of Nations, Treoty Series, vol. CLXXVI, p. 199, and
Additional Protocol (Brussels, 1934) (ibid., p. 215) .

:}

d'etre essentielle les navires publics engages dans des
operations commerciales". 228 Its main 06ject was clearly to assimilate the position of State-exploited merchant
ships to that of private vessels of commerce in regard to
the question of immunities. Article 1 provides:

codes, draft conventions and resolutions. The following
endeavours have contributed substantially to the
advancement of legal developments and should not
escape present notice.

Seagoing vessels owned or operated by States, cargoes owned by
them, and cargoes and passengers carried 011 government vessels, and
the States owning or operating such vessels, or owning such cargoes,
Ire subject in respect of claims relating to the operation of such
vessels or the carriage of such cargoes, to the same rules of liability
and to the same obligations as those applicable to private vessels,
cargoes and equipments.

(a) Resolutions of the Institute of
International Law
113. The Hamburg Draft Resolution of 1891 contains
a provision limiting the application of immunities in
certain cases, notably "actions relating to a commercial
or industrial establishment or to a railway, operated by
the foreign State in the territory". 231 A similar provision is contained in article 3 of the final draft resolution
adopted by the Institute in 1951:

(c) Regional intergovernmental bodies
111. While the efforts of the Council of Europe
culminated in the entry into force of the European
Convention on State Immunity (1972), similar efforts
have also been or are being pursued m other regions.
The Central American States, the Inter-American
Council and the Caribbean States have been considering similar projects.229 It is not insignificant to note the
contribution made in this field by the Asian-African
Legal Consultative Committee, which set up a Committee on Immunity of States in respect of Commercial and
other Transactions of a Private Character. In 1960, the
AALCC adopted the final report of the Committee.
The final report records that all delegations except that
of Indonesia ". . . were of the view that a distmction
should be made between different types of state activity
and immunity to forei$n states should not be granted in
respect of their actiVities which may be called commercial or of private nature". Although a final decision
was postponed, the following recommendations were
made:
(i) State Trading Organisations which have a separate juristic
entity under the Municipal Laws of the country where they are
incorporated should not be entitled to the immunity of the state in
respect of any of its activities in a foreign state. Such organisations
and their representatives could be sued in the Municipal Courts of a
foreign state in respect of their transactions or activities in their State.
(ii) A State which enters into transactions of a commercial or
private character ought not to raise the plea of sovereign immunity if
sued in the courts of a foreign state in respect of such transactions. If
the plea of immunity is raised it should not be admissible to deprive
the jurisdiction of the Domestic Courts.230

4. CoNTRIBUTIONS FROM NON-GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES
112. Reflecting in a way a clearly emerging trend in
the opinions of writers are the results of efforts towards
formulation of rules of international law on the subject
by private non-governmental circles in the form of draft
mG. Gidel, Le droit international public de /0 mer (Chateauroux,
Mellottee, 1932), vol. II, p. 362. See also the provisions of the 1958
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, especially section III of
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Conti$uous Zone
(United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 516, p. 214) and article 9 of the
Convention on the High Seas (ibid., vol. 450, p. 86).
229 See , for example, the letter of the Government of Barbados to
the Secretariat, statin~ that it was "in the process of considering such
legislation (as the Umted Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978) and in
addition is spearheading efforts for a Caribbean Convention on State
Immunity" (reproduced in United Nations, Mtllerials on Jurisdictionallmmuniltes ... , pp. 74-75).
230 Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Report on the
Third Session (Colombo, 20 JanUJlry to 4 Februory 1960) (New Delhi)
(n.d.l, p. 68. See also M. M. Whiteman, Digest of Inlernalional Law
(Was'bington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), vol. 6,
pp. 572-574.

The courts of a State may hear cases involving a foreign State
whenever the act giving rise to the case is an acle de C011ll'Mrce*,
similar to that of an ordinary individual, and within the meaning of
the definition accepted in the countries involved in the case.232

On 30 April 1954, the Institute adopted new resolutions
on the immunity of foreign States from jurisdiction and
execution, confirming immunity in regard to acts of
sovereignty but upholding jurisdiction relating to an act
which under the lex fori is not an act of sovereign
authority.

(b) Draft code of the International
Law Association
114. Article III of the Strupp draft code of 1926,
prepared for the International Law Association, also
enumerates certain exceptions to the doctrine of State
immunity, including". . . especially for all cases where
the State [or the sovereign] acts not as the holder of
public authority, but as a person in f,rivate law, particularly if it engages in commerce· . _ . '.233 More recently,
the International Law Association took occasion to
restudy the problem at its 45th Conference (Lucerne,
1952); the problem is under re-examination by the
Association.
(c) Hatvard draft convention on competence of courts
in regard to foreign Stales, 1932
115. The Harvard Research Center has prepared a
number of draft conventions and commentaries for the
"Research in International Law" of the Harvard Law
School. Article 11 of the Harvard draft convention on
competence of courts in regard to forei~n States of 1932
subjects a foreign State to local jurisdiction:
... when, in the territory of such other State, it engages in an
industrial, commercial, financial or other business enterprise in which
private persons may there engage, or does an act there in connection

231 Article 4, para. 3, of the "Projet de reglement international sur
la competence des tribunaux dans les proces contre les Etats,
souverains ou chefs d'Etat etrangers" (Institute of International Law.
Tableau general des resolutions (1873-1956) (Basel, 1957). pp. 14-

15).
232 AnnUJlire de l'lnstitut de droit international, 1952 (Basel), vol.
44, part I, p. 37. The expression "gestion patrimoniale", used in the
origmal draft, was replaced by the term "actes de commerce", which,
according to Niboyet, was more in keeping with the modem activity
of the State (ibid., p. 131) and "with it, one is on relatively firm and
familiar ground" (Traite (op. cit.), vol. VI, part 1, p. 350); see also
footnote 104 above.
233K. Strupp, "Reforme et codification du droit international:
Projet d'une convention sur I'immunite en droit international",
International Law Association, Rq?ort of the Thirty-fourth Conference (VielllUl, 1926) (London, 1927), pp. 426 et seq.
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respect of a trading or commercial activity of another
State even though it may be partly or wholly carried on
in the latter's territory.
(b) Increasingly, there appears to be stronger support and justification for. disallowing immunity and
therefore for the court of one State to exercise its
territorial competence or subject-matter jurisdiction as
respects the activities of another State in a commercial,
industrial or financial field.
(c) The problem of defining the notion of "trading or
commercial activity" is one that seems difficult to avoid
in this particular connection, although on earlier occasions in relation to diplomatic immunities289 and regulation of international trade 290 there appears to have been
no compelling necessity for such a definition, as a
general notion of trade is well understood. On the
other hand, other endeavours, notably the Harvard
draft 291 and national legislation such as the Pakistan
State Immunity Ordinance, 1981,292 have found it useful to insert a provision on use of terms or a definition
provision. The expression necessarily covers a single
Isolated transaction, such as a contract of sale or
purchase of goods or services, as well as a series of acts
or a course of conduct, or the operation of a business
enterprise or organization.
289There was no definition provision in regard to the private
trading activities of a diplomatic agent in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.
500, p. 95), either in article 31 of the convention or in the commentary to draft article 29 proposed by the Commission (Yearbook . ..
1958, vol. II, pp. 98-99, document A/3859).
290There was found to be no necessity for a definition of "State
trading enterprise" in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, vol. IV (Sales
No.: GATT/I969-1». The wider term "public commercial enterprise" as defined by article 54 of the Havana Charter of 1947 refers to
agencies of government engaging in trade as well as to trading
enterprises referred to in article 46 in connection with restrictive
business practices. Article 29, paras. 1-2, of the Charter distinguish
between ordinary sales and purchases, and imports of products
purchased for governmental purposes not with a VIew to commercial
resale. (For the text of the Cliarter, see United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, Havana, 21 November 1947-24 March 1948,
Final Act and Related Documents (E/CONF.2/78), sect. II.)
29ISee article 11 of the Harvard draft, op. cit., p. 597 (see footnote
33 above).
292See section 5, subsection (3) of the Ordinance (see paras.
10>-106 and footnote 220 above).

(d) Even with a well-defined concept of trading or
commercial activity, there may still be a need for the
adoption of further criteria to identify or facilitate the
deSignation or classification of an activity as "trading or
commercial" by reference either to the nature of the
activity, or to its p'urpose, or to both the nature and the
purpose, primanly the nature and if need be also the
underlying public or governmental object of a particular activity or transaction. 293
(e) Another practical test consists in the assimilation
of the position of a State to that of a private person or
enterprise carrying on a trade or busmess in the territory of another State. Implied consent or implied
waiver of immunity has also been advanced as an added
justification for an assimilative theory.
(f) The idea of profit-making or speculation of
lucrative gains is not altogether alien to the notion of
trade or commerce, although it is not always a realizable condition of fact. A further question that can be
pertinently asked relates to the extent, if any, to which
the notion of profit can be considered relevant to the
determination of the non-pUblic character or the private and commercial nature of a transaction or
activity.294
(g) Reciprocity has furnished a further justification
for mutual limitation of State immunity in respect of
trading.
2.
121.

TEXT OF DRAFT ARTICLE

12

Draft article 12 reads as follows:

Article 12.. Trading or commercial activity
1. In the absence of agreement to the contrary, a
State is not immune from the jurisdiction of another
State in respect of proceedings relating to any trading or
commercial activity conducted by it, partly or wboDy in
the territory of that other State, being an activity in
which private persons or entities may there engage;
2. Paragrapb 1 does not apply to transactions concluded between States, nor to contracts concluded on a
government-to-government basis.
293See draft article 2, para. 1(f) (footnote 9 above), and draft
article 3, para. 2 (footnote 10 above).
294See, for example, article 26 of the Harvard draft, op. cit., p. 716.

